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ABSTRACT  
This thesis examines the United States’ Supreme Court’s decision in the Kiobel case and argues 
the decision unjustly and unreasonably favored the interests of corporations over human rights. 
In doing so, the Court significantly narrowed the scope of the Alien Tort Statute in a manner 
which allowed the Court to distance itself from and obscure the inescapable political costs of the 
Kiobel decision. The Court does so by focusing on technical jurisdictional questions instead of 
the thorny issue of corporate responsibility for human rights abuses committed or encouraged in 
the pursuit of profit. Even on the jurisdictional and technical legal questions, the Court is 
selective, inconsistent, and contradictory in how it applies legal reasoning. This thesis analyzes 
both the Court’s legal inconsistencies and the politics of its decision. 
In the early twenty-first century, plaintiffs successfully established jurisdiction under the Alien 
Tort Statute in the U.S. federal court system and won damages against corporations for 
extraterritorial human rights abuses. The Kiobel plaintiffs, former residents of the Ogoniland 
region of Nigeria, filed a case against the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and the U.K.’s Shell 
Trade and Transportation Company for aiding and abetting human rights violations and 
environmental destruction committed by the Nigerian government. I begin by discussing the 
evolution of Alien Tort jurisprudence in the U.S. and the facts of the Kiobel case. Then, I 
assemble my conceptual framework drawing on the relationship between law and politics, 
specifically as it plays out in international law. Next, I explain the Court’s decision in Kiobel. I 
demonstrate the legal inconsistencies in the decision, followed by a discussion of the larger 
political issues impacting the decision. I chose this structure not because I view the legal and 
political questions as distinct, but because I believe this structure best highlights the impact of 
the unspoken political considerations on the legal decisions made in Kiobel.  
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I. Introduction 
Since the end of World War II, the international community has focused considerable attention 
on the concept of human rights. While there are valid critiques of the international human rights 
project,1 states and international organizations have invested considerable effort in advancing 
this project through codifying international human rights law (IHRL). One prevalent challenge 
for IHRL is enforceability. There are limited avenues available to pursue remedies for violations 
of IHRL, and judicial victories often offer merely symbolic victories. In 1980, the United States 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in the Filartiga case raised the possibility of opening 
the U.S. federal judicial system for the enforcement of rights already existing under international 
law through the U.S. Alien Tort Statute of 1789.2 This could provide certain victims of serious 
breaches of IHRL a legal forum to seek financial compensation.3  
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), alternatively referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act, was 
included in Section 9 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 and initially gave cognizance to “the 
circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”4 The text was slightly amended during the 
1948 revision of the Judicial Code to: “[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty.”5 
The ATS is a jurisdictional statute which provides federal courts jurisdiction to hear tort cases 
between aliens arising from breaches of treaties or customary international law (CIL). A tort is a 
civil wrong caused by a wrongful act or a non-contractual infringement on another’s rights which 
creates liability.6 The ATS creates a channel for awarding compensation for civil wrongs, and 
ATS jurisprudence relies heavily on the common law understanding of transitory torts. As Blum 
and Steinhardt explain, the doctrine of transitory torts holds that "the tortfeasor's wrongful acts 
create an obligation which follows him across national boundaries”.7 In this regard, the ATS is 
not concerned with assigning criminal or state responsibility for breaches of international law. It 
 
1 I will detail these critiques in Chapter I.C. 
2 Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980). [Hereinafter Filartiga] 
3 In Chapter V, I will discuss the legal parameters of tortuous breaches of international law. 
4 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. 
5 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
6 Oxford English Dictionary (2 ed. 2017). 
7 Jeffery Blum & Ralph Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Law: The Alien Torts Claim 
Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 Har. Int’l L.J. 53, 87-97 (1981) 
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does not propose the U.S. federal court system assume the role of human rights monitoring 
mechanism or criminal tribunal. Instead, it is narrowly applicable to awarding compensation to 
aliens for torts committed in violation of treaty law or CIL. 
There is scarce information about the intent of the ATS drafters, and few cases attempted to 
establish jurisdiction under the ATS between 1789 and 1980.8 This changed after the Filartiga 
decision, and a number of IHRL cases were successfully brought under the ATS during the 
1980s and 1990s. Simultaneously lauded as the solution to the unenforceability of IHRL,9 and 
condemned as dangerous jurisdictional overreach,10 there is no shortage of literature weighing 
the pros and cons of adjudicating IHRL under the ATS. While early cases primarily addressed 
human rights violations committed by individuals, cases have increasingly sought redress for the 
tortuous actions of corporations.11 However, recent judicial decisions have limited the Statute’s 
scope in a manner which precludes courts from hearing most of these cases and calls into 
question the ATS’ applicability outside the narrowest circumstances. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kiobel v Dutch Petroleum Co12 is the most recent example of this trend.  
The Kiobel case reflected a change in litigation strategy. Since the start of the twenty-first 
century, cases under the ATS have sought redress for alleged tortuous breaches of IHRL 
involving multinational corporations. This includes breaches allegedly committed by 
international corporations and cases where corporations are alleged to have aided and abetted 
states or other actors in violating IHRL to protect their investment. These cases were often 
settled outside of court, resulting in little appellate oversight and conflicting jurisprudence. In 
Kiobel, members of the Ogoni community whose human rights were violated by the Nigerian 
government and community members’ descendants sued the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 
and Shell Transport and Trading Company. The alleged violations occurred during these two 
 
8 Jansen v. The Brigantine Vrow Christina Magdalena, 3 U.S. 133 (1795) (D.S.C. 1794) [shipping dispute]; Bolchos v. 
Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (No. 1,607) (DC SC 1795); & Adra v. Clift 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) [custody dispute].  
9Id; see e.g. Burke, Coliver, De la Vega, & Rosenbaum, Application of International Human Rights Law in State and 
Federal Court,  18 Tex. Int’l L. J. 291, 321 (1983). 
10 See Farooq Hassan, A Conflict of Philosophies: The Filartiga Jurisprudence, 32 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 250, 258 (1983); 
Curtis Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and US Law, 2001 U. Chi. Legal F. 323, 350 (2001). 
11 In cases where the plaintiff is an American national, the defendant is an American corporation, or the alleged 
tortuous action occurred in the United States, there are other applicable domestic laws. However, the ATS is the 
primary legal channel for cases involving alien plaintiffs.   
12 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 113 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). [Hereinafter Kiobel]. This refers to the majority 
opinion authored by Justice Roberts. 
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companies’ joint development project with Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. 
Notably, this case addressed the corporations’ role in the Nigerian government’s conduct and the 
destruction of the Ogoni peoples’ land during petroleum and natural gas extraction.  
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that ATS did not establish jurisdiction for such a case, 
though the legal reasoning between the majority and minority opinion differed significantly. The 
majority opinion, written by Justice Roberts, concluded that the ATS, as a jurisdictional statute, 
does not dispel the presumption against extraterritorial application of substantive laws.13 The 
majority opinion also left in place the Second Circuit Court’s decision that the conduct of 
transnational corporations did not fall within ATS jurisdiction. The Second Circuit Court’s 
decision contradicted previous ATS jurisprudence and drastically limited jurisdiction. By leaving 
this decision in place, the Supreme Court allowed for a significant legal change without itself 
directly addressing the central question of whether tortuous acts committed by international 
corporations fall within the scope of the ATS. In this manner, the Supreme Court judgment 
focuses on technical jurisdictional issues and at times avoids directly addressing some of the 
more controversial legal questions. Despite efforts to distance itself from politics, this decision is 
one with inescapably high political stakes and has produced detrimental consequences. 
I argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel was flawed because the political costs 
unjustly and unreasonably favor corporations over human rights. Specifically, I argue that the 
Court evades taking responsibility for such a costly decision by hiding behind jurisdictional and 
technical legal questions and not directly engaging with the inescapable political stakes involved. 
Additionally, even on the jurisdictional and technical legal questions, the Court is selective, 
inconsistent, and contradictory in how it applies legal reasoning, including its own precedents. 
As a result, the Court significantly narrowed ATS jurisdiction in a manner which obscured the 
political ramifications of its decision and favored corporate actors.  
The Kiobel decision is not unique in its attempt to separate dry legal issues from the larger 
political questions. Rather, courts often distinguish legal decisions from political choices, 
reinforcing a narrative which obscures the politics of law. However, courts and judges are 
political actors and their decisions dictate the invisible rules which control the distribution of 
 
13 Id  
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resources. The Court’s decision in Kiobel provides an illustrative example of how the focus on 
technical issues, such as jurisdiction, obscures a decision’s high political cost. In each of 
Chapters III, IV and V, I begin by explaining the Court’s decision in Kiobel. I then demonstrate 
the legal inconsistencies in the decision, followed by a discussion of the larger political issues 
impacting the decision. I use this structure not because I view the legal and political questions as 
distinct, but because I believe it best highlights the impact of the unspoken political 
considerations on the legal discourse used in Kiobel. It would be impossible to correctly assess 
the legal questions and understand the legal inconsistencies without the larger political 
discussion that follows, particularly the ramifications of the Kiobel decisions for victims of 
human rights abuse who wish to bring cases under the ATS. 
The Court’s reconceptualization of jurisdiction under the ATS significantly alters the types of 
cases which can be brought under the Statute in a manner which appears apolitical. Prior to 
Kiobel, plaintiffs regularly brought cases against international corporations for human rights 
violations committed in breach of the law of nations. The corporations often settled these cases 
outside of court before trial, providing the victims with financial compensation. More 
importantly, there is credible evidence that corporations altered their behavior because of the 
possibility of litigation under the ATS.14 While I agree it is necessary to provide some limitations 
for ATS litigation, I am critical of the Kiobel approach: An approach which appears to erect 
procedural barriers to cases against corporations on the basis of legal reasoning alone without 
discussing and engaging with the politics of where this line is drawn. Analyzing how the 
Supreme Court justified the Kiobel decision and obscured the political considerations and 
ramifications of its judgment is a useful tool for understanding the legal form and the 
consequences of its putative separation of law and politics. In Kiobel, the Court altered the 
jurisdictional scope of the ATS, precluding most extraterritorial cases, and leaving in place the 
Second Circuit Court’s decision that cases against international corporations do not fall within 
the scope of the ATS. As a result, an avenue for human rights violations’ redress has been all but 
closed off in manner which does not acknowledge the political stakes involved.  
I argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel is legally inconsistent and politically 
unsound. In Chapter II, I begin with an overview of relevant ATS jurisprudence in Section II.A 
 
14 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. 562 F. 3d 163 (3d. Cir. 2009). [hereinafter Pfizer] 
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In Section II.B, I present the facts of the Kiobel case and its procedural history. Section II.C 
addresses my methodology. In Chapter III, I discuss the Supreme Court’s choice to raise the 
question of extraterritoriality sua sponte instead of addressing the question of corporate liability 
central to the Second Circuit Court’s decision. Section III.A presents the majority opinion’s 
statements about raising the presumption against extraterritoriality sua sponte. In Section III.B, I 
discuss the legal inconsistencies with the decision to raise the presumption against 
extraterritoriality without addressing the Second Circuit Court’s key question on corporate 
liability. Section III.C argues the Supreme Court made a political choice to introduce the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and not confirm or vacate the Second Circuit Court’s 
decision, thus erecting two procedural barriers for potential ATS plaintiffs. Chapter IV addresses 
how the Court analyzes jurisdiction under the ATS in Kiobel and its reliance on the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. In Section IV.A, I present the sections of the majority and minority’s 
opinions related to the presumption against extraterritoriality. In Subsection IV.B, I illustrate 
how the Court’s decision to elucidate the content of “the law of nations” contradicts the Court’s 
decision in Sosa and previous courts understandings of foreign policy implications arising out of 
ATS cases. In Section IV.C I argue the majority’s application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality obscures its choice to preclude politically inconvenient developments in 
contemporary CIL. In Chapter V, I focus on the undefined “touch and concern…with significant 
force” for extraterritorial breaches of IHRL adopted by the Court.15 Section V.A. presents the 
thresholds of linkage to the U.S. needed to for ATS jurisdiction outlined in the majority and 
minority opinion. Section V.B notes that this approach fails situate Kiobel in light of previous 
courts decisions, primarily the Filartiga decision which has served as the cornerstone of ATS 
jurisprudence for over thirty years. In Section V.C, I focus on the majority’s threshold and how it 
further insulates corporations from liability for the human rights abuses they commit. In the final 
Chapter, I conclude with an explanation of how the Kiobel decision continues a global trend of 
privileging international corporations at the expense of victims of human rights abuses. The 
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank precluded corporate liability under 
the ATS further immunizing corporations.   
 
 
15 Supra note 12 at 1669. 
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II. Background  
Before analyzing the Kiobel decision, I begin with a discussion of the relevant background 
information on the emergence of ATS jurisprudence, the factual and procedural history of the 
Kiobel case, and my methodology. The Kiobel decision is not the first judgment to roll back 
jurisdiction under the ATS. The first Section describes how Supreme Court and appellate courts 
have systematically limited the cases adjudicated under the ATS, a necessary exercise due to the 
Statute’s vague wording and limited preparatory works. The second Section focuses on the 
history of the Kiobel decision, beginning with the political situation in Nigeria and the 
relationship between the defendants and the alleged IHRL violations; before proceeding to the 
case’s procedural history. Finally, I lay out my conceptual framework to analyze the legal 
inconsistencies and politics of the Kiobel decision. The observation that law and politics are 
intertwined but often treated as though they were distinct is not new, and I use existing literature 
to understand how this phenomenon manifests in Kiobel and the resulting consequences. The 
nature and indeterminacy of the legal form renders it possible to reach a variety of decisions in 
any given case. Yet, in actuality, decisions have progressively insulated international 
corporations from the human rights abuses they perpetrate or encourage. 
A. History of Alien Tort Jurisprudence 
The Alien Tort Statute was incorporated into Section 9 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789, and 
drafters’ intentions for its inclusion are the subject of considerable modern debate. For the first 
two hundred years, the ATS received little attention because few cases established federal 
jurisdiction under it.16 However, in 1979, the Center for Constitutional Rights brought a case on 
behalf of Honduran nationals, Dolly and Joel Filartiga, against fellow Honduran, Pena-Irala for 
tortuous acts committed outside the U.S. The case, which was filed in the New York District 
Court, alleged that Pena-Irala had tortured and killed the plaintiff’s descendent, Joelito Filartiga, 
in violation of “the law of nations.”17 The District Court initially dismissed the claim on the 
grounds that, while the prohibition against torture may be CIL, precedent dictated that 
 
16 There were a few exceptions: Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) [admiralty law]; Jansen 
v. The Brigantine Vrow Christina Magdalena, 3 U.S. 133 (1795) (D.S.C. 1794) [shipping dispute]; Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 
F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) [maritime dispute over slave ship]; Dreyfus v. von Flick, 534 F.2d. 24 (2d Cir.) cert. denied 
[property expropriation].    
17 Supra note 2 at 890. 
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international law only governed the relationship between states. The Court acknowledged the 
strength of the plaintiff’s case but believed that precedent set by Dreyfus v. von Flick’s precluded 
the court from hearing cases related to a state’s treatment of its nationals.18  
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court issued a landmark ruling, allowing the case to be heard 
under the ATS. The Court examined the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, subsequent 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions, and U.S. foreign policy statements and concluded 
“international law confers fundamental rights on all people vis-à-vis their own government”19. It 
read the ATS as opening the federal judicial system for the enforcement of rights already in 
existence under international law, such as the right to freedom from torture.20 This decision 
inspired a subsequent chain of cases seeking damages for international torts arising from 
violations of IHRL and eventually expanded the range of defendants. It also required the 
judiciary to delineate limitations on which cases fell within the scope of the ATS, a process 
which involved various and sometimes inconsistent judgments from appellate courts.  
Though some scholars initially feared the U.S. district court system would become a hub for 
international human rights cases,21 the ATS’ scope was subsequently narrowed in three distinct 
ways. First, the courts defined the ATS as statutory in nature, rather than as a law which could 
establish a cause of action. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arabic Republic,22 the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia unanimously dismissed the case brought against Libya and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization by Israeli survivors of a 1978 terrorist attack. Judges’ reasoning for their 
decision differed,23 with one judge focusing on differentiating the ATS as a jurisdictional statute 
rather than a cause of action. As the ATS itself could not be breached, he found the plaintiff must 
establish the content of the “law of nations” to prove subject matter jurisdiction,24 thus making 
this a substantive element of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over the dispute rather than part 
of the merits assessment. This approach was adopted by other appellate courts and confirmed by 
 
18 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 577 F. Supp. 860 (1984). 
19 Supra note 2 at 885. 
20 Id at 888-890. 
21 Supra note 10. 
22 Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arabic Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D.C.C. 1981). 
23 Judge Bork’s decision to dismiss the case centered on this interpretation of the ATS. Judge Edwards disagreed 
but vacated the claim on the grounds that while the law of nations prohibits torture, it does not extend 
liability/responsibility to non-state actors. Judge Robb did not address this question because he dismissed the case 
on the grounds it would violate the separation of powers doctrine.  
24 Supra note 22 at 799. 
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the Supreme Court in the Sosa case. Second, Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(TVPA), which allowed individuals to bring civil suits against their individual torturers in U.S. 
federal court, thus creating a lex specialis for cases such as Filartiga.25 The TVPA provides the 
courts with a congressional grant to adjudicate matters which impact U.S. foreign policy and 
includes a ten year statute of limitations and obligation to exhaust local remedies before filing a 
case, which are not included in the ATS. While the majority of courts recognize that the ATS 
and TVPA are not mutually exclusive, the Seventh Circuit Court decided the TVPA precludes 
torture and extrajudicial killing cases under the ATS.26 The courts have also imported to the ATS 
the obligation to exhaust local remedies.27 Third, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act precluded ATS litigation against states in Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation.28 Thus, the ATS only confers jurisdiction for cases against 
a state agent, not the state itself. These subsequent decisions “cast doubt on its [Filartiga’s] 
continued validity as precedent in all but the narrowest of circumstances.”29 That is to say, while 
the ATS only covers cases involving a tort committed in violation of international treaty or CIL, 
courts have further narrowed its applicability.  
In 2006, the Supreme Court imposed additional barriers on potential ATS plaintiffs in its 
landmark decision in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain. The case was highly political and touched on 
issues related to the U.S. war on drugs, the conduct of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 
Mexican-American relations, and cross-border migration. In 1985, DEA agent Enrique 
Camarena-Salazar was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered by members of a Mexican drug cartel, 
allegedly including Humberto Alvarez-Machain. When the Mexican government refused to 
extradite Alvarez-Machain, the DEA commissioned several Mexican nationals, including 
defendant Jose Francisco Sosa, to kidnap Alvarez-Machain and take him to the United States to 
 
25 Under the TVPA, nationals or non-nations may bring a case against an individual who, while acting in the 
capacity of a foreign state, engaged in acts of torture or extrajudicial killing. It does not allow an individual to bring 
a civil suit against a state or corporate actor.  This was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court’s decision  in Mohamad v. 
Palestinian Authority 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). 
26 Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2005). 
27 Ekaterina Apostolova, The Relationship between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 
Berkeley J. Int’l L. 640, 652 (2010). 
28 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, 488 US 428 (1989). 
29 Karen Holt, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala After Ten Years: Major Breakthrough or Legal Oddity 20 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L.  
543, 569 (1990). 
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stand trial.30 Alvarez-Machain was ultimately found not guilty of crimes committed in relation to 
the murder of the DEA agent and filed civil suits against the United States and the aliens who 
kidnapped him under the ATS, TVPA and the Federal Torts Claims Act in the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of California.31 Alvarez-Machain argued the kidnapping amounted 
to arbitrary detention and that the prohibition against arbitrary detention had crystalized as CIL. 
The District Court issued a summary judgment and $25,000 in damages under the ATS, and their 
decision was affirmed on appeal by the Ninth Circuit Court. The case appeared before the 
Supreme Court in 2004, and was the Court’s first ATS decision in the twenty-first century. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa narrowed the ATS in three distinct ways. First, it affirmed 
the ATS was jurisdictional in nature and does not provide a cause of action.32 Plaintiffs can only 
establish jurisdiction under the ATS if they can identify an international law that was breached. 
Second, it “raise[d] a new question . . . about the interaction between the ATS at the time of its 
enactment and the ambient law of the era.”33 As a result, they differentiate between the threshold 
for when an international norm becomes binding CIL and when such law is domestically 
enforceable under the ATS. This creates a requirement for additional specificity in the latter 
case.34 Third, the Court reoriented its approach to ascertaining the existence of a CIL. Instead of 
the Filartiga approach, which drew heavily on international conventions, U.N. General 
Assembly Resolutions, and statements made by state leaders, the Sosa decision dismissed these 
sources in favor of a strict assessment of actual state practice. While acknowledging that state 
practice may evidence the existence of CIL but may also occur in violation of CIL, the Court 
assessed examples of state practices of arbitrary detention as evidence that the prohibition of 
arbitrary detention was not CIL. They held that state practices of arbitrary detention carried more 
weight than the prohibition against arbitrary detention enshrined in the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.35 
 
30 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) [hereinafter Sosa]. 
31 For the purpose of this thesis, I will only address the Supreme Court’s decision on issues pertaining to the ATS. 
However, the Court dismissed the case in its entirety. 
32 Supra note 30 at 714. 
33 Id at 740. 
34 Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, & David Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing 
Relevance of Erie, 120 Har. L. Rev. 869, 936 (2007). 
35 Supra note 30 at 734, 736. 
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The Sosa decision created a new threshold for defining the content of the law of nations for the 
purposes of the ATS, which limited the types of cases for which the ATS provided jurisdiction. 
As the window for filing ATS seemingly narrowed, litigation began to focus on corporate 
defendants who had the ability to pay compensation and damages, instead of individuals who 
were largely former government officials with more limited resources.36 The filed cases 
attempted to hold corporations liable for human rights abuses and environmental destruction 
arising out of joint venture projects or for actions undertaken to protect their investments.37 The 
cases have relied heavily on the principles of liability for aiding and abetting and transitory 
torts,38 to attempt to prove that corporations’ conduct amounted to breaches of CIL. In Doe v. 
Unocal Corp, the Ninth Circuit Court found that a corporation may be subject to an ATS suit for 
aiding and abetting,39 while Khulumani v. Barclay outlined the circumstances in which an 
individual could be found liable in this regard. This liability could be established when the 
individual provides practical assistance to the principle actor, which has a substantial effect on 
the crime and does so with the intent to perpetrate the crime.40 The decision relied heavily on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’s definition of intent.41 However, the 
Khulumani decision only considered the actions of natural persons, and did not engage with 
corporate liability. Following the Second Circuit Court’s decision in Khulumani, scholars 
debated whether CIL included corporate liability,42 and the potential impact of ATS litigation 
against corporate entities under IHRL. Ultimately, the Supreme Court answered this debate in 
Jesner and held that corporate liability did not fall within the scope of the ATS. 
 
36 Supra note 10. 
37 Beth Van Schaak, Unfulfilled Promises: The Human Rights Class Action, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 279, 352 
(2003).Plaintiffs have argued environmental destruction violates a number of human rights obligations, including 
(but not limited to) the right an environment and the right to life. 
38 Defined by the Supreme Court in Kiobel as the principle that the character of a tort allowed it to be enforced 
across jurisdictions, lest the tortfeasor escape penalty by fleeing to another jurisdiction. Supra note 12 at 1666. 
39 Doe I v. Unocal Corp.395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit Court dismissed the case on factual grounds, 
but left the door open for future ATS litigations against corporations for aid and abetting. 
40 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd 504 F. 3d 260 (2d Cir. 2007).  
41 The Court cites Article 25 of the Rome Statute of the Criminal Court (1998). It found Article 25 reflects an 
international consensus on the standard for intent needed to establish individual liability for aiding and abetting 
despite the U.S. refusal to ratify the Rome Statute.  
42 Matthew Danforth, Corporate Civil Liability under the Alien Tort Statute: Exploring Its Possibility and 
Jurisdictional Limitations,” 44 Cornell Int’l L. J. 659, 691 (2011).  
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Despite the lack of judicial consensus, several plaintiffs won cases against corporate actors, and 
more secured out of court settlements from corporations that were hoping to avoid the publicity 
associated with a trial or the risk of even more costly verdicts. In Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 
Cuban plaintiffs received a judgment of $80 million in damages as a result of Curacao Drydock 
Corporation’s use of forced labor.43 Bangladeshi torture survivors also secured a judgment for 
financial compensation from the Worldtel Bangladesh Holding Ltd after the corporation 
employed Bangladeshi police officers to torture the plaintiffs.44 The decision was vacated 
following the Kiobel decision because the alleged human rights violations occurred outside the 
United States. In addition to these decisions, a number of transnational corporations settled cases 
prior to judgment. Pfizer, a U.S. based pharmaceutical company, settled three cases stemming 
from its nonconsensual testing of the experimental meningitis drug Trovan during an outbreak in 
Nigeria.45 Out of court settlements were also agreed upon in Doe v. Unocal46and Doe I v. Gap, 
Inc.47 This trend is not unique to the U.S., and plaintiffs filed cases against in the Netherlands 
against Total, S.A. (a French oil firm which allegedly cooperated with the Myanmar government 
in human rights abuses) and Shell Petroleum (for environmental damage in Nigeria).48 There is 
evidence that the proliferation of IHRL cases versus corporations was seen by corporations as 
concerning and influenced their behaviors According to Baxter, multinational corporations 
adopted voluntary codes of conduct including IHRL riders in an effort to prevent ATS 
litigation.49 It was at this time that Nigerian plaintiffs in the Kiobel case filed a suit against the 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and British Shell Transport and Trading Company.  
 
 
 
 
 
43 Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D.Fla. 2008). 
44 Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., et al., 588 F. Supp.2d 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Aug. 2009). [The case 
was overturned following Kiobel]. 
45 Supra note 14; Judith Chomsky, Will the Real ATS Please Stand Up, 33 Suffolk Tansnat’l L. Rev. 461, 474 (2010). 
46 Doe v. Unocal, 248 F. 3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) [human rights violations perpetrated during the construction of 
Yadana gas line in Myanmar]. 
47 Doe I v. Gap, Inc. No. CV-01-0031, 2001 WL 1842389, at *1 (D. N. Mar. I. Nov. 26, 2001) [violations of labor rights 
in Saipan]. 
48 Supra note 45. 
49 Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power of the Judiciary: Why the Use of State Department "Statements of Interest" in 
Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul of Separation of Powers Concerns, 37 RUTGERS L. J. 807, 830 (2006). 
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B. Kiobel Case 
B.1.  Facts  
The Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in the Kiobel case, radically altering the 
jurisdictional understanding of the ATS and calling into question the Statute’s overall 
applicability. The nexus of the Kiobel case lies in the relationship between the Netherland’s 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (RDPC), the British Shell Transport and Trading Company 
(STTC), and the violent tactics the Nigerian government used to suppress the Ogonis’ dissent 
towards its economic policies. The case arose out of an ongoing conflict between the Ogoni 
people of Nigeria and the state-owned Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, which 
is a subsidiary of the two defendants. The Ogoni peoples opposed Nigerian government policies 
which caused economic exploitation, political marginalization, and environmental destruction. 
The Nigerian police and military’s abuses towards the Ogoni people are well documented,50 and 
include extrajudicial killings, rape, torture, arbitrary detention, and property destruction. Many 
Ogonis were killed or displaced internally, but a small number received refugee status and were 
resettled to the U.S. In 2006, twelve of these former residents of Ogoni sued RDPC and STCC 
for their complicity in numerous violations of IHRL: extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, 
torture, forced exile, crimes against humanity, property destruction, and violations of the right to 
life, liberty, security, and association.51 The case was filed in New York District Court before an 
appeal to the Second Circuit Court, and subsequent hearing before the Supreme Court.  
Since decolonization, the Nigerian government has officially advocated for a decentralized 
federation, but in actuality power and control of resource allocation is centralized in the hands of 
northern military elites. The top-down approach to governance marginalized numerous ethnic 
and tribal minorities, including the Ogoni. The Ogoni’s situation was further compounded by the 
land they own in the oil-rich Niger delta.52 The extraction process has ravaged the Ogonis’ land 
and destroyed traditional means of livelihood ever since the discovery of petroleum and natural 
gas in their region. The results of oil and gas extraction were financially lucrative to the Nigerian 
state and the international companies which owned Shell Nigeria. During the early 1990s, over 
 
50 Amnesty Int’l, Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta 11 (2009). 
51 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 621 F. 3d 111 (2d. Cir. 2010). 
52 Claude Welch Jr. The Ogoni and Self-Determination: Increasing Violence in Nigeria, 33 J. Modern Afr. Stud. 635, 
650 (1995). 
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90% of the Nigerian state’s foreign-exchange earnings came from oil and gas-related sales and 
royalties.53 While certain sectors of Nigerian society benefited economically from the Shell 
Petroleum Company of Nigeria’s presence in the Niger delta, the company largely excluded the 
Ogoni from its labor force, and the region lacked basic infrastructure and access to sanitation or 
health services.54 Extraction was lucrative for the transnational corporations involved in the 
project. Shell Nigeria’s parent companies, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Trade and 
Transportation Company, gained sizeable profits for their shareholders.55 Thus, both had a vested 
interest in preventing local resistance to the economic status quo in the Niger Delta.  
The continued economic marginalization, environmental destruction, and lack of political 
representation spurred Ogoni resistance to the Nigerian government’s economic policies. The 
most influential group, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MSOP), is alternately 
characterized as a movement for political self-determination, a movement of local resistance to 
foreign economic exploitation, or a movement for economic self-determination.56 Others argue 
that the Ogoni identity is a by-product of colonial disruption of local rule, or a seemingly ethnic 
mobilization cloaking a government-elite struggle for control of oil revenues.57 Despite the 
difficulties in categorizing this multifaceted resistance movement, the MSOP was successful in 
building solidarity across ethnic and class lines and garnering international attention. In 1990, 
MSOP initiated protests against the Shell Petroleum Company of Nigeria and demanded 
compensation for damage caused to their environment. Subsequently, the Nigerian government 
responded to the company’s calls for assistance and brutally attacked villages, destroyed homes, 
and raped and killed numerous residents.58 Following this crackdown, government memos were 
released which linked their use of force with the need to ensure “smooth economic conditions to 
commence.”59 In 1995, after violence at a Constitutional Assembly led to the deaths of four 
Ogoni elders, the Nigerian government arrested, tortured, and executed without a fair trial nine 
leading members of the MSOP. These incidents were part of a longer campaign of state-
 
53 Supra note 50. 
54 Cyril Obi. Globalisation and Local Resistance: The Case of the Ogoni versus Shell, 2 New Pol. Econ. 137, 148 
(1997).   
55 Supra note 52. 
56 Supra note 54. 
57 V. Adefemi Isumonah. The Making of the Ogoni Ethnic Group, 74 Africa: J. Int’l. Af. Institute 433, 453 (2004). 
58 Supra note 52 at 123.  
59 Supra note 50. 
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sponsored violence directed at the Ogoni people, which killed, raped, and displaced hundreds of 
thousands.60 Unlike the majority of state-sanctioned violence perpetrated to appease 
transnational actors, the Ogoni peoples’ campaigns managed to attract international attention 
after the 1995 execution of the “Ogoni 9.” One of the executed leaders was Dr. Barinem Kiobel, 
whose descendants joined the Center for Constitutional Rights and EarthRights International to 
bring the case against RDPC and STTC under the ATS. His descendants expressed hope that the 
ATS would provide a forum to seek financial redress from the transnational corporations which 
owned Nigerian Shell Petroleum.61  
International law plays a role in constructing the nature of this dispute, the parties to the conflict, 
and the relationship between them. As described in my thesis, it in many ways continues to 
legitimize much of the economic and environmental exploitation inflicted by the Nigerian 
government and transnational corporations. Today, sporadic clashes between the Ogoni and the 
Nigerian state infrequently occur. However, it is important to note that while the active conflict 
in Ogoniland has subsided, competition for control of the vast oil reserves still plagues Nigeria 
and Shell Petroleum Company of Nigeria’s extraction and exploitation continues to damage the 
environment. There are nearly two million internally displaced Nigerian nationals,62 and the state 
and its corporate partners continue to violate IHRL in order to quell dissent over economic 
policies and environmental destruction.63 As Nigerian military and political elites battle for 
control of the state’s lucrative natural resources, transnational corporations profit despite, or 
arguably because of, the suffering of Nigerian nationals.   
B.2.  Procedural History 
The New York District Court initially dismissed the allegations of forced exile, crimes against 
humanity, property destruction, and violations of the right to life, liberty, security, and 
extrajudicial killing, as they lacked a sufficient definition to be considered violations of the law 
of nations, and thus create subject matter jurisdiction.64 To make this decision, it relied heavily 
 
60 Tyler Banks, Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute: The Second Circuit’s Misstep Around the General 
Principles of International Law in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 26 Emory L. J. 227, 281 (2012). 
61 Supra note 53. 
62 UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Nigeria Factsheet (2016). 
63 Supra note 51. 
64 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464-65, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The district court relied on 
the “specific, universal, and obligatory" set by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and determined the 
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on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa, which ordered a limited reading of the “law of 
nations.”65 However, the District Court upheld the prohibition of torture, right to assembly, and 
prohibition against arbitrary detention as a having sufficient foundation.66 The Second Circuit 
Court focused on the question of whether the ATS applied to corporate defendants and dismissed 
the case on the grounds that corporate liability for internationally wrongful acts is not a 
sufficiently recognized norm in international law.67 Its decision, which attracted considerable 
attention, was at odds with some previous appellate jurisprudence on corporate liability.68 
Following this decision, the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to hear the case. After oral 
arguments on corporate liability in international law, the Court made the unusual decision to 
raise the presumption against extraterritoriality sua sponte and rehear oral arguments. The Court 
unanimously ruled that the plaintiffs in Kiobel lacked standing. The justices’ reasoning differed 
as to the nature of relationship between tortuous action and the U.S. that was needed to establish 
jurisdiction. This decision significantly narrowed the scope of the ATS and caused numerous 
cases to be dismissed or overturned by lower courts. The constitutive elements of this decision 
and the political factors at play will further detailed Chapters III, IV and V. 
C. Conceptual Framework 
I have one overall argument and two sub-arguments. I argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kiobel unjustly favors the interests of transnational corporations over human rights. First, I argue 
that the manner in which the Supreme Court decided Kiobel allowed the judges to distance 
themselves from the decision’s political ramifications. The Court evades taking responsibility for 
such a costly decision by hiding behind jurisdictional and technical legal questions and not 
directly engaging with the inescapable political stakes involved in such a decision. It framed its 
decision as dealing with dry and technical jurisdictional issues rather than the question of 
corporate responsibility for human rights violations committed in pursuit of profit. Second, I 
 
content of each human rights obligation lacked specificity, and therefore could not constitute the corpus of the 
“law of nations.”  
65Supra note 30. The Court held the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest did not amount to customary 
international law. They stated that the Universal Declaration was a non-binding instrument and the U.S. signed and 
ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights on the premise the treaty was not self-executing. 
This reasoning differs from the approach in Filartiga and will be discussed further in the Chapter IV. 
66 Id. 
67 Supra note 51. 
68 See, Supra note 39, Supra note 40, & Supra note 43. 
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argue that even on the jurisdictional and technical legal questions, the Court is selective, 
inconsistent, and contradictory in how it applies legal reasoning including its own precedents. 
The reason for these legal inconsistencies is the Court’s unwillingness to engage with its own 
politics. To analyze the legal inconsistencies and the political challenges of Kiobel, my 
conceptual framework draws on theories of ATS jurisprudence, legal realism, critical legal 
studies, and third world approaches to international law (TWAIL) scholarship.  
To make this overall argument and the two sub-arguments, my conceptual framework involves 
situating the Kiobel case within the larger body of ATS cases to show the flaws in the legal 
reasoning in the Supreme Court’s decision and how they contradict precedent. This is done in the 
Subjection C.1. It is also necessary to position this thesis within the larger narrative of the 
artificial law-versus-politics divide. Jurists and legal theorists have spent centuries grappling 
with the nature and consequences of this distinction. While their approaches and intentions may 
differ from each other, and indeed from my own intent, many of these scholars have created a 
helpful lens through which I understand the consequences of the Court’s decision in Kiobel. 
Thus, in Subsections C.2 and C.3, I assemble my conceptual framework drawing from the 
available literature on the interplay between law and politics. I use this approach to underscore 
the extent to which law can obscure the role of politics. In Subsection C.2, I draw from literature 
on the relationship between law and politics generally, and Subsection C.3, I draw from literature 
focusing specifically on how law as politics is manifested in international law.  
C.1.  Tracing the Evolution of the Alien Tort Statute 
To address the legal inconsistencies within the Kiobel decision, I examine the legal reasoning in 
previous ATS cases. Using Kiobel as a starting point, I analyze the larger chain of ATS cases 
which began with Filartiga and the gradual narrowing of the statute’s jurisdiction. This gradual 
narrowing accelerated at the start of the twenty-first century, and the Kiobel decision is an 
example of this phenomenon. I adopt Thomas Lee’s classification of the life of ATS into three 
distinct phases: its birth and relative uselessness from 1783-1980, its role as an international 
human rights enforcement mechanism during the height of Pax Americana (1980-2000), and its 
applicability post-Kiobel.69 This evolutionary narrative is also the structure of Holt and Van 
 
69 Thomas Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 
89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1645, 1670 (2013-2014). 
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Schaak’s pieces,70 which focus on the time period between 1980 and 1995 but divide the 
narrative less categorically. Viewing ATS litigation as a single evolving entity presents the 
“story” of ATS cases before Kiobel and how that decision does or does not fit with previous 
decisions. I start with Kiobel decision and contrast it with the reasoning in earlier ATS decisions, 
identifying the legal inconsistencies that led to a gradual narrowing of ATS jurisdiction. This 
framework is central to understanding the legal inconsistencies in the Kiobel decision, and thus 
my first sub-argument, but insufficient to address the politics of the decision. In Subsection 
II.C.2, I discuss the relationship between law and politics generally and how legal rules dictate 
the allocation of power and coercion in society.  
C.2.  Understanding the Relationship between Law and Politics 
The existence of a relationship between law and politics is not controversial but the exact nature 
and consequences of the relationship continue to be the subject of examination and debate. Law 
is defined as “a rule of conduct or action prescribed or formally recognized as binding by a 
controlling authority.”71 The creation, interpretation, and enforcement of a law is inherently 
political, and considerable academic attention is paid to the politics of this process. Traditionally, 
judicial decisions are often viewed as distinctly apolitical and neutral; the judge pronounces the 
“right” answer based on deducing and applying the relevant law.72 This approach obscures the 
relationship between politics and judicial decision in a manner which creates an artificial 
separation between the realms of legal and political. It also fails to address the role of power and 
violence inherent to legal systems. This thesis analyzes the political choices inherent to the legal 
form and how these choices’ impact distribution of resources in the context of Kiobel. 
In the 1920s, Robert Hale explored the connection between power and coercion and presented an 
economic analysis of law as the distribution of coercion and freedom backed by the threat of 
force.73 He explains that “the channels into which industry shall flow, then, as well as the 
apportionment of the communities’ wealth, depend on coercive agreements.”74 In the case of 
torts, Hale emphasizes that judicial edicts determine which damaging actions create a tortuous 
 
70 Supra note 29 & 38. 
71 Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2016. 
72Richard Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1109 (1975). 
73 Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 494 (1923). 
74 Id at 493. 
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cause of action and which are considered damnum absque injuria.75 This contradicts the 
traditional U.S. definition of prima facie torts as “intentionally to do that which is calculated in 
the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does in fact, damage another person’s 
property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse.”76 Specifically, he highlights 
the dichotomy between this traditional understanding of torts and the reality that judges consider 
damage caused in the interest of competition as worth the cost.77 Since the majority of economic 
damage is justifiable as competition, it falls into the category of damnum absque injuria for 
which no remedy is needed. In the absence of an alternative legal avenue for redress, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel considered as damnum absque injuria tortuous violations of 
IHRL committed outside of the U.S. Hale’s work underscores the manner in which judicial 
decisions create the invisible rules which govern the allotment of resources and capital among 
social classes to create a constant state of class struggle. 
In the late twentieth century, Duncan Kennedy expanded this analysis in two distinct ways. First, 
he observed that law’s influence on the distribution of wealth extends beyond social class and 
proposed it also determines the distribution of wealth along racial and gendered lines. Since the 
outcome of joint economic production is the result of coercion (rather than free choice, as 
contended by conservative economic rhetoric), legal rules compel adherence to the state’s 
preferred distribution of coercion. In his view, judges are central players in this process because 
they decide the legality or illegality of specific acts. Thus, the delineation between a political 
legislative body and an apolitical judiciary are false.78 During the 1960s and 1970s, “liberal 
reformers”79 in the judiciary radically reimagined legal ground rules to improve the standing of 
Black and female Americans. Kennedy notes that this simultaneously drew attention to the 
judiciary’s powerful political capacity and obscured its impact on the structuring of class 
inequality. Among the illustrative examples he provides is the disparate impact of capital 
movement laws and subsequent deindustrialization on urban Black males, thus highlighting that 
apparently neutral or unrelated decisions are still central to resource distribution. In the context 
 
75 Robert Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 196, 218 (1946). 
76 Bowen, L. J., in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q. B. D.598, 613 (1889) as cited in Id. at 196. 
Hale begins his analysis of torts with this quote as the de facto definition. 
77 Supra note 75.  
78 Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault! 4 J. Leg. Stud. 327, 366 (1990).  
79 Id at 342. 
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of the Kiobel case, his theory would call into question the invisible rules which already divide 
access to capital and the impact such a decision has on access to redistributive methods and 
monetary redress. His approach expands Hale’s analysis and illustrates its applicability beyond 
social class to issues of race, gender, and other vectors, depicting how judicial decisions, and 
indeed law as a whole, play an important part in structuring distribution of power and wealth in 
society. In Subsection II.C.3, I analyze how the specific history and structure of international law 
has impacted ATS litigation, particularly the role of corporations in ATS    
C.3.  Understanding the Relationship between International Law and Politics 
The relationship between law and politics is also central to understanding the international legal 
order and its impact on ATS adjudication in the U.S. The politics of international law should not 
be viewed in isolation from the larger discourse on law and politics. As in domestic law, 
international law was largely written by elites with their own interests in mind, and judicial 
decisions still require adjudicators make a political decision on how to apply otherwise 
indeterminate law.80 These decisions, as in domestic law, structure the distribution of resources 
and bargaining power among peoples and states. However, the particular structure and history of 
international law raises additional issues. The politics of international law not only impact how 
U.S. courts have defined the content of the “law of nations,” but how ATS litigation figures into 
the larger international human rights movement.  
One of the key critiques of international law is a lack of internal coherence, which results partly 
from the belief that Enlightenment ideals could organize international society similar to its uses 
domestically. Koskenniemi states that despite interest in a uniform Rule of Law capable of 
resolving disputes, 
[s]ocial conflict must still be solved by political means and that even though there may 
 exist a common legal rhetoric among international lawyers, that rhetoric must, for reasons 
 internal to the ideal itself, rely on essentially contested - political - principles to justify 
 outcomes to international disputes.81     
 
80 I use “elite” here to refer to both the politically powerful individuals who represent their countries at the 
international level and the dominate countries whose voices carry more (if not undue) weight on global 
governance. The latter I discuss in detail in subsequent paragraphs. For an illustration of the former, See Sonia 
Harris-Short, Listening to the ‘Other?’ The Convention on the Rights of the Child, 2 Melbourne J. Int’l. L. (2001) at 
10-12. 
81 Marrti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EJIL 4, 32 (1990). 
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In explaining why international law cannot escape politics, he identifies its need to be 
simultaneously concrete and normative. Without the former, the international law project strays 
towards the realm of natural law, while the latter is required to differentiate law from a simple 
extension of power politics. This dichotomy reflects the two critiques lodged against 
international law: It is too political because it depends on state practice or it is too political 
because it relies on contested ideals.82 He points to reliance on opinio juris to differentiate the 
content of CIL from a mere codification of state action while at the same time determining 
opinio juris through consistent state practice, as a reoccurring pattern in legal arguments.83 
Koskenniemi illustrates how this circularity of legal arguments ultimately results in 
indeterminacy, and his analysis of this processes as it relates to CIL describes the processes 
adopted by U.S. courts in previous ATS cases. Specifically, it illustrates the Supreme Court’s 
attempts to elucidate the content of the law of nations in Kiobel, which I discuss in Chapter IV. 
Legal indeterminacy provides judges with considerable leeway in determining the applicable 
law. This lends itself to the types of inconsistent legal reasoning and politically problematic 
decisions as apparent in Kiobel. 
One of the ways the politics of international law has manifested itself is in the creation of 
institutional biases. David Kennedy notes that the field of international law has become 
fragmented in a manner similar to domestic law.84 He points to the perceived divergence 
between public international law (a field rife with political questions related to violence, 
transition, and criminality) and private international law (a domain which shuns politics in favor 
of technical and commercial expertise). In a case such as Kiobel, this divide unduly divorces 
Nigeria’s political instability and state-sanctioned human rights abuses from the economic rules 
governing the extraction of its resources and relationship with transnational corporations. One of 
the ramifications of this fragmentation and institutionalization of norms is the emergence of 
competing institutions and specializations. Koskenniemi focuses on the structural biases in these 
institutions regimes; the favored actors, proposed solutions, and hierarchy of norms reflects the 
institution’s politics.85 This is another process which impacts ATS litigation, as district and 
appellate courts have sought to derive an understanding of corporate liability from (among 
 
82 Koskenniemi terms these poles “apologies” and “utopia.” 
83 Supra note 81. 
84 David Kennedy, The Political Economy of Centers and Peripheries, 25 Leiden J. Int’l. L. 7, 36 (2013). 
85 Marrti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law-20 Years Later, 20 EJIL 7, 19 (2011). 
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others) international criminal law, international environmental law, private international law, and 
international human rights law. The institutionalization and structural biases caused by 
fragmentation create another level of politics imbedded in the international law project. 
While the legal form, whether domestic or international, is radically indeterminate, there are 
clear patterns in the groups it marginalizes. Theoretically, it would be possible for judges to 
reach divergent decisions as the result of this indeterminacy. However, decisions regularly 
disadvantage marginalized groups: women, peoples of the global South, working classes, people 
of color, Indigenous peoples, and so on. The marginalization is the result of both the invisible 
rules governing the distribution of resources, as discussed in the previous subsection, and 
institutional bias as created by law. The Kiobel decision reflects the structural violence 
embedded in the international legal system and the trend of increasing protection for 
multinational corporations at the expense of human rights. The critiques of international law 
generally, and IHRL specifically, advanced by TWAIL scholars provides a framework for 
analyzing the manner in which this occurs.   
The question of corporate liability in international law occurs within the larger context of the 
history of international law and the progress narrative often superimposed on its development, 
which obscures the discipline’s actual evolution. Antony Anghie’s Imperialism, Sovereignty, and 
the Making of International Law sets out to trace international law’s relationship to the colonial 
and imperial projects with which it intertwines and in many cases justifies. In the introduction to 
the book, he proposes that colonialism shaped the foundation of international law, and questions 
what this means for post-colonial states’ engagement with global governance.86 His emphasis, 
which is shared by other TWAIL scholars, is on evaluating the rules of international law through 
the lived experience of those most impacted, namely peoples in the Third World, developing 
world, or global South.87 Since the 1600s, imperialist policies have been justified through a 
civilization narrative, which allows the conqueror (states in the global North) to portray its 
actions as in the best interest of the conquered (peoples of the global South). This approach is 
apparent in the discourse surrounding temporally and geographically diverse projects, including 
the League of Nation’s Mandate System, seventeenth century trading companies, and 
 
86 Antony Anghie, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
87 Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in 
Internal Conflict, 2 Chinese JIL 77, 103 (2003) 
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contemporary international institutions.88 While a detailed analysis of this history falls outside 
the scope of this research, the twenty-first century manifestation of the civilizing mission, the 
international human rights and development project, is central to situating the Kiobel decision.  
When discussing the threat of neocolonialism facing the Third World, B.S. Chimni identifies the 
“internationalization of human rights”89 and the growing complexity of jurisdiction as key 
vehicles through which this process is occurring. Both critiques of the twenty-first century world 
order directly pertain to ATS litigation in the U.S. and raise questions which speak to directly to 
concerns general concerns about the Statute90 and its impact on the global South.91 Chimni is not 
alone in his critique of the IHRL project, which has been lambasted as a dangerous erosion of 
national sovereignty,92 a non-inclusive Western construct,93 and a confining hegemonic 
discourse.94 David Kennedy notes that IHRL language is used to justify bombings, regime 
change, and life without parole prison sentences.95 Within the TWAIL movement, particular 
attention is paid to how the language of IHRL has been co-opted by and grown alongside of 
today’s iteration of the “civilizing movement”: international development. Among numerous 
critiques of the human rights-development narrative, Anghie raises the way it obscures the 
structural and systemic nature of suffering in the Third World.96 It places the blame on Third 
World governments for failing to secure their nationals’ rights, thereby localizing the problem 
while turning a blind eye to what Susan Marks refers to as the “planned misery” of the 
international system.97 Chimni also focuses on the manner in which the language of “law” and 
 
88 Supra note 86. 
89 B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto in, THE THIRD WORLD AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS, AND GLOBALIZATION 47, 73 (A. Anghie, B. Chimni, K. Mickelson, O. 
Okaford eds. 2003) at 55. 
90 For a larger discussion on the broad range of concerns See: AnneMarie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff 
Diplomacy, 79 Foreign Affairs 102, 116 (2000); Bradford Clark & Anthonly Bellia, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law 
of Nations, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 445, 552 (2011); Curtis Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and US Law, 2001 U. Chi. Legal 
F. 323, 350 (2001). 
91 Farooq Hassan, A Conflict of Philosophies: The Filartiga Jurisprudence, 32 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 250, 258 (1983) 
92 Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and International Human Rights 28 Ethics and Int’l. Aff. 225, 238 (2014) at 225. 
Donnelly presents an overview of scholars whose work focuses on IHRL’s diminishing impact on state sovereignty. 
93 See, e.g. Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights 42 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 201, 
245 (2002);  Walter Mignolo, Who Speaks for the “Human” in Human Rights? 5 Hispanic Issues Online, 7, 24 (2009). 
94 David Kennedy, International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 101, 126 
(2002). 
95 Supra note 85. 
96 Supra note 86. 
97 Susan Marks, Human Rights and the Bottom Billion, 1 Eur. H.R. L. Rev. 37, 49 (2009). 
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“rights” legitimizes the development narrative as part of a global march to progress despite neo-
liberal reforms that structurally favor the North.98 However, the current litigation strategy in ATS 
cases has the potential to somewhat upend this narrative within IHRL. Foreign sovereigns are 
immune from ATS jurisdiction pursuant to the Foreign Sovereigns Immunity Act of 1976,99 and 
current ATS cases attempt to hold multinational corporations accountable for violations of 
IHRL, the majority of which are occurring in the global South. In Kiobel, the Supreme Court 
could have opened the U.S. federal court system to cases against multinational corporations, thus 
partially remedying one of the chief critiques of the IHRL movement, its fixation on the 
governments of the global South. Instead, it privileged the interests of capital and multinational 
corporations, an aspect of their judgment I will further explore in Chapters III and IV. 
Finally, Chimni addresses the issue of complex jurisdictions and “the intersection of jurisdictions 
which gives rise to multiple (or concurrent) and extra-territorial jurisdiction”.100 This reflects 
Kennedy and Koskenniemi’s observations about the fragmentation of law and subsequent 
proliferation of institutional oversight bodies.101 In ATS jurisprudence, multiple or concurrent 
jurisdiction has been raised as an issue of forum non conveniens and it has been alleged that the 
U.S. federal court system was not the appropriate forum for specific cases. In Kiobel, the Dutch 
and British governments (where the defendant corporations are incorporated) submitted an 
amicus curiae brief supporting corporate liability for human rights violations but arguing there 
were more appropriate legal forums for the case.102 While the Supreme Court did not address this 
argument in the Kiobel decision, it is a recurring argument defendants employ to oppose ATS 
jurisdiction. Chimni’s concern about extraterritorial jurisdiction is that powerful states establish 
laws with an extraterritorial reach, a privilege that weaker states cannot effectively share. Anne 
Marie Slaughter and David Bosco expressed their fears that prolific ATS litigation could have 
create “super courts” ready to govern the political affairs of other states.103 However, the ATS 
concerns itself with civil liability, not attributing criminal or state responsibility. In the Kiobel 
 
98 Supra note 89. 
99 Supra note 28. The Supreme Court resolved this issue in its 1989 decision in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess 
Shipping Corporation available at Supra note 28. 
100 Supra note 89 at 57.  
101 Supra notes 84 & 85. 
102 Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland in support of neither party, No. 10-1491 (2011). 
103 Supra note 90. 
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case, there was no intention of interfering in the political affairs of the Nigerian government or 
the states where Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. or Shell Transport & Trading Company are 
incorporated. Rather, the plaintiffs sought financial redress for civil wrongs committed by 
multinational corporations that had a relationship with the U.S.  
The Kiobel case raises a number of issues which directly link to the TWAIL critiques I have just 
discussed. There is little doubt that previous ATS litigation assisted in promoting the largely 
unquestioned image of human rights as progress and prior cases involved U.S. courts 
adjudicating on extraterritorial events. However, I think the ATS has the potential to partially 
alter the rules which govern the system, and act as a redistributive conduit. It also has the 
potential to reframe the IHRL narrative by focusing also on the corporations who profit from 
human rights abuses instead of on governments in the global South. There is almost always some 
link between the U.S. and the corporate defendant. In Kiobel, both companies trade on the New 
York Stock Exchange, and also benefited from the international development and governance 
policies enacted by institutions with a structural bias favoring the U.S. TWAIL scholarship on 
international law generally and IHRL specifically is helpful for situating Kiobel in a larger legal 
system once used to legitimize colonialism and now protecting the interest of corporations over 
the lives of peoples, particularly those in the global South.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the legal inconsistencies and politics of the Kiobel 
decision. I find the manner in which the judges obscured the political considerations behind legal 
arguments about jurisdiction to be particularly troubling. Combining Robert Hale and Duncan 
Kennedy’s analysis of the judiciary’s role in dictating the distribution of coercion, and thus 
economic resources, with prevailing critique on the history and structure of international law, 
creates a helpful theoretical starting point for my thesis. I also draw heavily on the theorists’ 
shared understanding that law’s potential for obscuring the political is systemic and routine; in 
this regard I view Kiobel as an example rather than an aberrant occurrence. While I think it 
desirable to provide some legal limitations to litigation under the ATS, I use above described 
theoretical framework to criticize the approach taken in Kiobel, one which appears to erect 
procedural barriers to cases against corporate entities without acknowledging the prevailing 
politics. I find analyzing the how the Supreme Court justified the Kiobel decision and silenced 
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the political considerations and ramifications of its judgment a useful tool for understanding the 
costs of failing to acknowledge the political consequences of judicial decisions. 
The following three Chapters analyze the main legal questions the Supreme Court addressed in 
the Kiobel decision. Chapter III discusses the Court’s decision to raise the question of 
extraterritoriality sua sponte.  Chapter IV addresses extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ATS 
and its incompatibility with Court precedent and international norms. Chapter V focuses on the 
new “touch and concern with significant force”104 threshold established by the majority.  Each 
Chapter begins with a discussion of the relevant aspects of the majority and minority opinions in 
Section A. Section B examines the legal inconsistencies in the opinions and their relationship to 
previous precedent. Section C focuses on the implicit political considerations and ramifications 
not addressed by the Court. I separate the legal inconsistencies from the political considerations 
purely for analytical purposes, to demonstrate that it is impossible to understand the reasons for 
Kiobel’s legal inconsistencies discussed in Section B without examining the political stakes as 
analyzed in Section C.  
  
 
104 Supra note 12 at 1669 
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III. Decision to Raise Extraterritoriality Sua Sponte 
In its Kiobel decision, the Second Circuit Court noted that due to the rapid proliferation of ATS 
litigations since 1980, the high percentage of pretrial settlements, and the statute’s linguistic 
ambiguity “there remain[s] a number of unresolved issues lurking in our ATS jurisprudence.”105 
To the Second Circuit Court, the Kiobel arguments proposed the unresolved issue of whether 
jurisdiction conferred by the ATS extended to corporate actors. After an extensive discussion on 
trends within international criminal law, the Second Circuit Court found no “sufficiently 
definite” norm of international law permitting corporate liability for violations if IHRL.106 The 
decision was controversial, and the concurring opinion penned by Judge Leval aggressively 
questioned the majority’s reasoning,107 while the Seventh Circuit Court’s contemporaneous 
decision in Flomo v. Firestone reached the opposite conclusion.108 Seeking to resolve this 
uncertainty, the Supreme Court responded to the Kiobel plaintiff’s petition for certiorari in 
October 2011.109  
After a week of oral arguments pertaining to whether the ATS granted jurisdiction to 
corporations, the Court requested supplementary arguments on whether the ATS’ jurisdiction 
extended to actions which occurred extraterritorially. I argue that by adjudicating the issue of 
extraterritoriality, rather than the question of corporate liability addressed by the appellate court, 
the Supreme Court erected dual procedural barriers to ATS litigation in a manner which oriented 
attention to jurisdiction rather than politics. In Section A, I begin by describing the Supreme 
Court’s decision to raise the issue of extraterritoriality sua sponte. I analyze the result of the 
decision, namely whether the Second Circuit Court’s decision in Kiobel remains binding 
precedent in Section B. In Section C, I shed light on this approach’s political ramifications and 
how it denies jurisdiction to two distinct set of plaintiffs.      
 
 
105 Supra note 51 at 117. 
106 The Court adopts the language of the Sosa decision in conferring ATS jurisdiction only on norms which were 
sufficiently definite to support this jurisdiction. Supra note 55 at 732-733. 
107 Judge Leval concurred with the decision to dismiss the case on procedural grounds. 643 F.3d 1013 (2d. Cir. 
2011), Leval concurring opinion. 
108 Id. 
109 132 S.Ct. 472, 181 L.Ed.2d 292 (2011) 
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A. Content of the Supreme Court’s Decision 
The initial arguments presented to the Supreme Court addressed the central question decided in 
the Second Circuit’s decision: does ATS jurisdiction extend to corporations? On March 6, 2012 
the Court requested supplemental briefings, and it held arguments on the question of 
extraterritoriality in October 2012. The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice Roberts 
and joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito.110 Justice Kennedy authored a brief 
concurring opinion,111 as did Justices Alito and Thomas.112 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, wrote an agreement concurring in judgment but differing in 
reasoning.113 The majority’s opinion does not set out to explain its choice to address the question 
of extraterritoriality instead of corporate liability. The majority mentions the Court’s request for 
supplementary arguments in passing when presenting the case history.114 The majority’s only 
acknowledgement that the initial question presented to the Court was that of corporate liability is 
a passing reference to corporations. Justice Roberts writes that “mere corporate presence” in the 
U.S. does not suffice to dispel the presumption against extraterritoriality.115 Absent from this 
statement is any indication as to whether the majority understood the ATS as conferring 
jurisdiction on a corporation to begin with. Neither the Alito nor Kennedy concurring opinions 
address the question of corporate liability or the decision to raise the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of domestic law sua sponte.116 Their opinions solely engage with the 
parameters of extraterritoriality as discussed further in Chapter IV. 
The minority opinion paid marginally more attention to the question of corporate liability. The 
decision, written by Justice Breyer, held that the ATS drafters intended for the statute to address 
cases “touching and concerning” the U.S. but reads this mandate more broadly than the majority. 
They found that preventing the country from becoming a “safe harbor… for the common enemy 
of mankind”,117 including human rights abusers, was inferable from the text of the Statute. The 
minority opinion appears more hospitable to addressing corporate liability under the ATS but 
 
110 Supra note 12. 
111 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 596 U.S. 1659 (2013). Kennedy, A. concurring. 
112 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 596 U.S. 1659 (2013). Alito, A. concurring. 
113 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 596 U.S. 1659 (2013). Breyer, S. concurring. 
114 Id.  
115 Supra note 12 at 1669. 
116 Supra note 112 & Supra note 113. 
117 Supra note 113 at 1674. 
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does not directly engage with this question either. The Kiobel decision affirmed the Second 
Circuit Court’s decision but did not explicitly endorse or refute its legal reasoning. By raising the 
presumption against the extraterritoriality sua sponte, the Supreme Court decided Kiobel without 
directly confronting the thorny question of corporate liability. 
B. Legal Inconsistencies 
B. 1.   Misuse of Sua Sponte  
The Supreme Court’s decision to raise a separate legal issue sua sponte is not without precedent, 
and this thesis does not propose to argue the parameters under which the Court should exercise 
this right. The Supreme Court’s rules provide leeway for it to choose which cases are heard and 
which arguments are addressed.118 Vestall explains “[T]he general rule is that litigants control 
the factual milieu of the controversy, [but] there are expectations and occasionally the appellate 
courts can and will go beyond the record presented.”119 The practice allows appellate courts to 
clarify the specific issues raised by parties. However, argument discretion can enable politically 
unaccountable appellate courts to determine policy. This concern led scholars to urge courts to 
only raise issues sua sponte in cases where the court would be otherwise equally divided or to 
remedy a legal error in a previous cases’ judgment.120 From the beginning, the Supreme Court 
justices’ line of questions in the initial Kiobel hearing indicated they did not believe the ATS 
should create jurisdiction in this case. Subsequently, they seized on an argument presented in an 
amici curiae brief delivered in support of the defendant.121 The argument in the brief centered on 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, which the majority adopted as the applicable law. The 
Supreme Court’s choice to raise extraterritoriality sua sponte determined the trajectory of 
arguments in a highly political decision and relied on an argument presented in an amici curiae 
brief, rather than the Second Circuit Court’s decision. Understanding the political factors which 
influenced this decision, namely the motivations of the brief’s six corporate authors and inner-
Court politics is key to appreciating Kiobel’s impact on the rules governing ATS cases  
 
118 Sup. CT. R. 51.1 allows the Supreme Court to request a rehearing on a decided case if the Court is evenly divided 
or was reconstituted. The ability to request a rehiring after the completion of oral arguments but prior to 
rendering a decision is not explicitly stated. 
119 Allan Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 Ford. L. Rev. 477, 512 (1954). 
120 Rosemary Krimble, Rehearing Sua Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Procedure for Judicial Policy-Making 65 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 919, 946 (1999). 
121 Paul Hoffman, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: First Impressions 52 Colum. J. Trnsnat’l. L. 28, 52 (2013). 
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B.2.   Relation to Second Circuit Court’s Decision 
The manner in which the Court decided Kiobel left open whether the Second Circuit Court’s 
initial decision created binding precedent. The Supreme Court’s decision reached the same 
conclusion: the ATS did not establish jurisdiction for the Kiobel case. However, its legal 
reasoning addressed the presumption against extraterritoriality as opposed to the corporate 
liability for acts violating the law of nations. Therefore, lower courts struggled over whether to 
interpret the Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision as endorsing or rebutting the Second Circuit 
Court’s decision. Appellate decisions delivered by the Second Circuit Court and the Ninth 
Circuit Court after Kiobel indicated a split understanding on how the final judgment impacts 
corporate liability.122 In Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank,123 the Second Circuit Court affirmed 
the District Court for Southern New Jersey’s decision to dismiss the case. It reasoned that “while 
imposing civil liability on individuals for torts that qualify under the ATS, [its decision in 
Kiobel] immunizes corporations from liability.”124 However, the Ninth Circuit Court held that 
the Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision implicitly rebutted this approach in Doe v. Nestle USA.125  
It read the Supreme Court’s edict that “mere corporate presence” in the U.S.  fails to establish 
ATS jurisdiction as indicating corporations may be liable if their actions dispel the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. While the Supreme Court’s judgment in Jesner v. Arab Bank rectified 
this divergence,126 its previous decision not to directly engage the question of corporate liability 
in Kiobel caused confusion among lower courts. 
C. Political Considerations 
The manner in which the Supreme Court adjudicated the Kiobel case raises four distinct political 
issues not addressed in the judgment. First, the Court decided to raise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
sua sponte, succumbing to inner-court politics. Second, the Court does not address the political 
motivations of the corporations whose brief first raised the question of extraterritoriality. Six 
transnational corporations, Chevron Corporation, Dole Food Company, Dow Chemical 
Company, Ford Motor Company, GlaxoSmithKline, and the Proctor & Gamble Company, 
 
122 Marco Basile, Nine Months Later: Kiobel in the Lower Courts, AJIL Unbound (2014). 
123No. 15-1580 (2d. Cir. 2016). 
124 Id at 30. 
125 No. 10-56739 (9th. Cir. 2013). 
126 584 U.S. __ (2018). 
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authored a brief supporting the defendant.127 Most were previous or current defendants in ATS 
litigation, and they had considerable interest in preventing ATS suits encompassing breaches of 
the law of nations which occurred abroad. Third, by not discussing the Second Circuit Court’s 
decision precluding corporate liability from the scope of the ATS, the Supreme Court created 
two procedural barriers for ATS plaintiffs without answering the question of corporate liability. 
Finally, this approach obscured the political questions associated with the Second Circuit Court’s 
approach to Kiobel, namely the reliance on corporate liability trends in international criminal law 
as opposed to other regimes of international law. Together, these political choices altered the 
distribution of bargaining power between plaintiffs and defendants in ATS suits in favor of the 
corporate actors.  
C.1.   Decision to Hear Sua Sponte Argument  
As discussed above, appellate courts are granted leeway to raise legal issues not initially 
presented by parties to a case. However, this is not intended to recast the judiciary as a legislative 
body with the ability to dictate policy. To ensure separation of powers, courts should not raise 
questions sua sponte to make policy decisions.128 The Supreme Court has outlined a two-pronged 
test for when issues should be raised sua sponte: “where a proper resolution is beyond any doubt 
or where injustice may otherwise result.”129 The Kiobel case does not fulfill these criteria. While 
the Court agreed the defendants’ conduct was too far removed from the United States to fall 
within the scope of the ATS, opinions differed as to the applicable law. The minority 
concurrence adopted a more case-by-case approach than the majority, which rejected the 
applicability of the presumption against extraterritoriality as the applicable law. The executive 
branch’s amicus curiae brief cautioned against a sweeping limitation of ATS jurisdiction and 
supported the ATS’ capacity for establishing jurisdiction over corporations in cases with stronger 
ties to the U.S.130 There was not consensus that the presumption against extraterritoriality was 
the applicable law, which falls short of the “beyond any doubt” threshold the Supreme Court had 
 
127 Brief of Chevron Corporation, Dole Food Company, Dow Chemical Company, Ford Motor Company, 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, and the Procter & Gamble Company as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (Feb. 3, 2012). 
128 Supra note at 119. 
129 Singleton v. Wuff, 48 U.S. 106 (1978) at 121. 
130 David Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule without a Rational 28 Md. J. Int’l. L. 241, 255 (2013).  
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previously outlined.131  Furthermore, the argument raised sua sponte did not protect against 
injustice. The defendants provided the Court numerous grounds for dismissing the case, 
including the argument accepted by the Second Circuit Court.132 During the initial hearing, the 
defendants’ arguments focused on corporate liability, providing the Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to redress any potential injustice in the defendants’ favor. The Court’s decision to 
raise arguments sua sponte is questionable because there was not consensus that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality was the applicable law, and there were other lines of argument raised 
by the parties which could have been pursued. 
One possible reason why the Court raised extraterritoriality sua sponte is inner-court politics.133 
In the Sosa case, Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion which “brought the ATS into the 
twenty-first century”,134 and primarily focused on the content of the modern law of nations. His 
concurring opinion in Kiobel indicated that he conceptualized the scope of the ATS more broadly 
than other justices in the majority.135 The extraterritoriality argument, which only included 
cursory mention of the law of nations, may have provided a line of argument which allowed 
Justice Kennedy to reconcile his approach with the rest of the majority.136 However, the Court’s 
decision in Kiobel did not engage with the reason it changed the legal issues at stake and leaves 
the door open for speculation as its intention. By raising the question of extraterritoriality sua 
sponte, the Court effectively altered the scope of the ATS in a manner that was not introduced by 
either party and arguably allowed the Court to act in a policy-making capacity.  
 
 
 
 
131 Supra at 129. 
132 Another potential line of argument presented during the first set of pleadings included an analogous reading of 
the Torture Victims Prevention Act. 
133 Supra note 118. 
134 Id at 40. He joined Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas in the majority opinion. 
135 Supra note 114. 
136 The Alito-Clarence concurrence indicates their narrower approach. Supra note 115.  
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Sosa, which was joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, advocated for a narrower 
reading of the ATS which would prevent federal courts from creating “new federal common law of 
international human rights.”  542 U.S. 692 (2004). Scalia, A. concurring 
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C.2.   Origins of the Extraterritoriality Argument 
The second political consideration is the source of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
argument the Court raised sua sponte. As discussed above, the argument was submitted to the 
Court in an amicus curiae brief authored by six transnational corporations.137 By their nature, 
amici curiae briefs reflect the interests of their authors. These six corporations had a vested 
interest in limiting the territorial scope of the ATS when authoring the brief in support of the 
defendants that raised the question of extraterritoriality.138 The initial amicus curiae brief 
expressed concern that an expanded interpretation of the ATS scope would unduly impact U.S. 
corporations by creating a cause of action for human rights violations in foreign countries.139 The 
reason for the corporations’ concerns is readily apparent: most were current or former defendants 
in ATS litigation. At the time, Chevron had recently defended itself against an ATS suit in the 
United States District Court for Northern California for its conduct in Nigeria. The case’s 
plaintiffs alleged Chevron aided and abetted the Nigerian government in violations of the law of 
nations with regards to equipment sold to Lagos. This equipment was then used by the Nigerian 
government to quell Ogoni dissent to the same resource extraction project as discussed in 
Kiobel.140 Furthermore, Chevron is a transnational corporation with major investments in oil 
extraction projects in over 180 countries. This includes states with a history of human rights 
abuses and environmental damage after decades of resource extraction.  
While the majority refers to Chevron as the brief’s author, it is not the only one of the six 
corporations embroiled in ATS litigation.141 ATS cases have been prepared against Ford Motor 
Company for aiding and abetting labor abuses in China.142 Similar concerns have been raised 
regarding Proctor and Gamble, due to its extensive business ties with Chinese development 
projects.143 Dole Food Corporation is among the fifty-seven companies charged hiring the United 
Self Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC), which the U.S. State Department listed as a terrorist 
 
137 Supra note 131. 
138 Pleadings record at 3. 
139 Supra note 127. 
140 Bowtow et al. v. Chevron Corporation et al. No. 09-15641 (9th Cir. 2010). 
141 Supra note 12. 
142 Gary Haufbauer & Nicholas Mitrokostas, AWAKENING THE MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 
(Institute for International Economics, eds. 2003). 
143 Joel Slawotsky, Liability for Defective Chinese Products under the Alien Torts Claims Act, 7 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. 
L. Rev. 519, 541 (2008).  
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organization, to quell labor protests and secure factories.144 There is currently a case pending 
against Dole in California state court for hiring AUC militias for private security services which 
resulted in deaths and property destruction.145 The final corporation involved in the brief was the 
Dow Chemical Company. In 2008, the Second Circuit Court upheld the dismissal of an ATS 
case filed against Dow for harm caused by the defoliant Agent Orange during the Vietnam 
War.146 Chevron and its associates presented the Court with a liability line of argument that 
promoted their interests in two ways. First, it limited the vast majority of ATS cases, which 
address tortuous actions committed extraterritorially. Second, it limits cases without directly 
deciding whether the ATS establishes jurisdiction for corporate defendants.147 The Court does 
not acknowledge the likelihood that Chevron and its co-authors’ position is impacted by their 
desire for their actions abroad not to fall within the scope of the ATS. The benefits of the Kiobel 
decision for corporate defendants are readily apparent. Months after the Kiobel decision, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court dismissed an ATS case against Chiquita Brands International which 
alleged the U.S.-based corporation for providing financial support to AUC militias.148 The 
Kiobel precedent immediately resulted in lower court decisions which dismissed cases against 
corporations for alleged violations of the law of nations occurring abroad.  
C.3.   Engagement with the Second Circuit Court’s Decision 
The subject matter of the Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision differed significantly from the 
Second Circuit Court appellate decision. As discussed in the previous section, both courts 
dismissed Kiobel but differed in their rationale. The Supreme Court’s approach, which centered 
on the presumption against extraterritoriality, is detailed in Chapters IV and V. The Second 
Circuit Court’s decision focused on corporate liability in international law. It drew a sharp 
distinction between the principle of corporate liability for tortuous action under domestic law and 
under international law, stating that the existence of the domestic principle is insufficient to 
prove the existence of a norm in international law.149 The Second Circuit Court’s opinion relied 
heavily on international criminal law, beginning with the Nuremberg trials’ emphasis on 
 
144 Adriaan Alsema, Coco Cola Facing Terrorism Support Charges in Columbia, Columbia Report (2016). 
145 Mendoza Gomez et al. v. Dole Food Company, Inc., CA2/5, B242400 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) 
146 Vietnamese Association for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Company, 05-1953 (2d. Cir. 2008). 
147 Jens David Ohlin, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
148 Cardona, et al v. Chiquita, et al. No. 12-14898 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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individual responsibility for certain human rights abuses.150 They trace the individual 
responsibility approach through the development of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The 
opinion emphasized the debate over corporate criminal responsibility during the drafting of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which culminated in a decision to attribute 
criminal responsibility only to natural persons.151 This approach raises two major questions about 
corporate liability that were not addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court and thus continue to create 
confusion and contradictory decisions across lower courts.  
First, the Second Circuit Court’s majority opinion approached the question of corporate liability 
through the lens of criminal responsibility. As discussed in Chapter II, the ATS is a statute 
providing federal courts with jurisdiction over tortuous actions between aliens. In that regard, it 
does not seek to attribute individual criminal responsibility or state responsibility for breaches of 
international law. The applicability of the international criminal law regime to the ATS was 
contested by scholars in the aftermath of that decision. Engle examines the difference between 
criminal responsibility and private liability in international law before assessing that the Second 
Circuit Court had applied the incorrect legal regime.152 Other scholars argue that there is a 
general trend in the politics of international law, which has largely avoided determining the 
existence of a doctrine of corporate liability for breaches of IHRL.153 Even within international 
criminal law, corporate liability is a more complex issue than the Second Circuit Court portrays 
it. While the Rome Statues and the statues of the ICTY and ICTR exclude corporate defendants, 
recent decisions by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have expanded jurisdiction to corporate 
defendants.154 The Second Circuit Court’s selective examination of corporate liability in 
international law is left unchallenged by the Supreme Court in Kiobel. 
 
150 Specific attention is paid to the cases involving the I.G. Farben corporation, which constructed and profited 
from Auschwitz. While 24 executives were charged with a variety of war crimes, the corporation itself was not 
listed as a defendant.  
151 Supra note 51. 
152 Eric Engle, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute, 34 Hous. J. Int’l 
L. 499, 518 (2012). 
153 Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent with International Trends, 89 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1671, 1694 (2013-2014). 
154 Nadia Bernaz, Corporate Criminal Liability under International Law: The New TV S.A.L and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. 
Cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 13 J. Int’l. Crim. L. 313, 330 (2015) at 315-316. The Appeals Panel found 
jurisdiction for legal persons [in this case corporations] for the offense of defamation.   
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Second, the Kiobel decision illustrates how legal indeterminacy may operate in international law. 
As Kennedy and Koskenniemi discussed,155 the fragmentation of international law gives rise to 
competing regimes and institutions. This provided the Second Circuit Court with considerable 
leeway to select the applicable law. As discussed above, ATS does not assign criminal 
responsibility to corporations or their executives. Rather, it questions whether corporations 
benefitted from the damage they cause or the damage caused by their partner organizations and 
subsidiaries. When viewed through this lens, there are other fields of law, such as international 
environmental law, better suited to answer the questions posed in Kiobel.156 However, the 
Second Circuit Court’s decision does not justify its choice to seek answers from the field of 
international criminal law. If the Supreme Court had explicitly vacated the Second Circuit 
Court’s decision, this line of reasoning would have been ruled incorrect. Likewise, if the 
Supreme Court had confirmed the judgment, it would have provided additional information 
clarifying the choice of applicable law. Instead, the manner in which the Supreme Court decided 
Kiobel left this judgment in place as precedent, while not discussing the central issue it raised, 
leaving in place an additional barrier to plaintiffs seeking redress from corporations. 
In Jesner,157 the Supreme Court acknowledged that their decision in Kiobel had not addressed 
the question of corporate liability.   
            C.4.   Procedural Barriers 
The decision to raise extraterritoriality sua sponte and the lack of engagement with the Second 
Circuit Court’s decision exemplifies both the indeterminacy of law and how this indeterminacy 
is used to further the interests of the powerful. In Kiobel, it serves to protect transnational 
corporations from financial liability for the human rights violations they encourage or commit. 
The manner in which the Supreme Court decided Kiobel highlights the indeterminacy of the 
legal form. The case brought before the Court addressed the question of corporate liability as 
CIL, however the Court’s decision focused on a completely distinct legal question. This is 
possible because of the elasticity of law and the lack of a singular rule applicable for each 
decision. In Lee’s categorization of ATS jurisprudence, the impact of judicial decisions on the 
 
155 Supra note 81 & 84. 
156 This question is further discussed in Chapter IV. 
157 Supra note 126. 
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scope of the ATS is apparent.158 Since 1789, the text of the Statute itself has remained relatively 
consistent, but its applicability and viability has been altered by judicial decisions. These 
decisions primarily favored a cautious approach, thus limiting the number of plaintiffs who 
would receive redress from ATS cases. In 1990, Karen Holt questioned whether the Filartiga 
decision was as momentous as people initially asserted because with each judicial decision the 
scope of the ATS narrowed.159 The viability of the ATS itself was questioned after the Sosa 
decision and again after Kiobel.160 This reflects the narrowing of the ATS in a manner which 
“appears to favor corporate defendants over human rights victims”.161 Despite initial hopes that 
the Kiobel would at least apply to U.S.-based corporations,162 lower courts read the decision in a 
way that further insulates corporate actors.   
The manner in which the Supreme Court handled the indeterminacy in Kiobel impacts the 
distribution of power between corporations and human rights victims, usually peoples from the 
global South. The question in Kiobel, as in the majority of ATS cases, centers on establishing 
jurisdiction, not on the merits of the case itself. Robert Hale’s work discusses damnum absque 
injuria, damage which is considered legally tolerable, and the invisible rules which control the 
allocation of power and resources.163 The judicial decision on issues of jurisdiction in Kiobel 
effectively altered the previous of power allocation in favor of corporations. Subsequent 
decisions, relying on the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit Court’s Kiobel precedent, have 
vacated prior settlements and dismissed current cases against foreign and American-based 
corporations and their executives. Because the Supreme Court failed to address the Second 
Circuit Court’s decision, cases were vacated or dismissed if the violation of the law of nations 
was extraterritorial (discussed further in Chapter IV), and if the defendant is a corporation 
(discussed further in Chapter V). In both cases, the injuries inflicted on the plaintiffs by 
international corporations are damnum absque injuria: tolerated, if only because there is no 
 
158 Supra note 69. 
159 Supra note 29. 
160 See, e.g. James Boeving Half-full…Or Completely Empty?: Environmental Alien Torts Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain 18 Geo. Envt. L. Rev. 109, 148 (2005); Steven Schneebaum, The Paquete Habana Sails On: International 
Law in U.S. Courts after Sosa, 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 81, 102, (2005) at 96 [The author ultimately concludes that the 
ATS survived Sosa but presents an overview of the counter-narrative] & Joseph Rome, RIP ATS? How Much of the 
Alien Tort Statute Survives the Supreme Court’s Decision in Kiobel? N.Y.U. J. Int’l. L & Pol. (2013). 
161 Anupam Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: Kiobel’s Unexpected Legacy 107 AJIL 829, 834 (2013) at 
829. 
162 Id. 
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forum for redress. Rather than serve as a potential avenue for peoples in the global South whose 
human rights are violated by corporations to obtain compensation, the Kiobel decision created 
additional procedural barriers for prospective plaintiffs. As described by Judge Leval of the 
Second Circuit Court in his concurring opinion in Kiobel, it “leaves corporations immune from 
suit and free to retain profits earned” through acts of genocide, slavery, war crimes, and 
torture.164 Equally troubling, the Court does so without acknowledging the political stakes 
involved, engaging with them, and taking responsibility for the consequences of their decision. 
In this Chapter, I provide an overview of the process whereby the Supreme Court came to decide 
Kiobel based on the presumption against extraterritoriality it raised sua sponte. An amicus curiae 
brief submitted by six transnational corporations encouraged the Court to limit the scope of the 
ATS in order to insulate corporations from litigation. The Court then made the decision to 
deviate from the normal course of arguments and pursue sua sponte the question of 
extraterritoriality mentioned in the corporate brief. In the Kiobel decision, the Court did not 
explicitly state whether the Second Circuit Court’s decision that the ATS did not establish 
jurisdiction for corporate actors is binding precedent, leading to differing interpretations across 
appellate courts. Effectively, Kiobel erected two hurdles for ATS plaintiffs, while obscuring the 
political stakes of the decision. The next Chapter analyzes the Court’s justification for narrowing 
ATS jurisdiction for extraterritorial human rights violations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F. 3d 111 (2d. Cir. 2010). Leval J., concurring opinion. 
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IV. Presumption against Extraterritoriality                                                                                                                                                   
On March 5, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court requested the parties to Kiobel submit supplementary 
briefs on the presumption against extraterritoriality. Parties argued about whether and when 
courts can recognize a cause of action for a violation of the law of nations that occurred wholly 
in the territory of another sovereign state.165 The doctrine of presumption against 
extraterritoriality limits the applicability of U.S. law to acts occurring abroad. The majority 
opinion relied entirely on this doctrine and stated that nothing in the text or history of the ATS 
rebutted this presumption.166 The Alito-Thomas concurring opinion167 and the Kennedy168 
concurring opinion agreed with the majority’s argument but differed on whether the presumption 
could be dispelled.169 The minority opinion170 reached the same conclusion as the majority and 
held that the ATS did not establish jurisdiction in Kiobel. However, it did not view the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as the applicable law. The minority approached the 
question through the lens of foreign policy and advanced a seemingly broader view of the ATS 
than the majority. However, it also limited the applicability of the ATS for violations of the law 
of nations which occur outside of U.S. territory.     
In Section A, I present the Court’s analysis of the doctrine of presumption against extraterritorial 
application of domestic law. First, I discuss the majority opinion and draw on the tensions 
between the Alito-Thomas and Kennedy concurrences in Subsection A.1. Then I describe the 
differing line of argument put forth by the minority in Subsection A.2. In Section B, I examine 
the legal inconsistencies in the majority opinion, chiefly an understanding of the crime of piracy 
which is at odds with the Sosa precedent and U.S. foreign policy interests. In Section C, I argue 
that domestic and international political considerations gave rise to the legal inconsistencies. 
This in turn has altered the balance of power in favor of ATS defendants, particularly 
corporations. 
 
165 Order in Pending Case, 565 U.S. (2012). 
166 Supra note 12. 
167 Supra note 112. 
168 Supra note 111. 
169 I will discuss the thresholds they propose in Chapter V. 
170Supra note 113. 
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    A. Content of the Court's Decision 
A.1.    Majority Opinion  
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Kennedy, Alito, 
Thomas, and Scalia, outlined the canon on statutory interpretation on the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of domestic law. This doctrine is derived from prior judicial decisions. 
It is typically invoked when deciding whether an Act of Congress continues to govern conduct 
abroad.171 In Morrison v. National Bank of Australia, the Supreme Court defined the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, stating that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of 
an extraterritorial application, it has none.”172 The Court has outlined the tripartite purpose of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. First, it minimizes the number of cases decided by U.S. 
courts that have overarching implication on foreign policy, as foreign policy is the executive 
branch’s purview.173 Second, it prevents U.S. domestic laws from conflicting with other states’ 
laws and potentially creating international disputes.174 Third, it reflects the “presumption that 
United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.”175 Traditionally, the 
doctrine of presumption against extraterritoriality was invoked in cases concerning the conduct 
of U.S. nationals or corporations abroad. However, in Kiobel the Court considered the principles 
underlying the doctrine applicable despite the jurisdictional nature of the ATS. Though the ATS 
does not create an independent cause of action, it carries significant foreign policy 
implications.176 Thus, the majority opinion treated the ATS as analogous with Acts of Congress 
 
171 Supra note 12. 
172 561 U.S. at 247 (2010) at 253. 
173 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). The Supreme Court found that the Labor 
Management Act of 1947 did not apply outside U.S. territorial waters. 
174 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). Finding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
does not apply extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of U.S. corporations employing U.S. workers 
abroad. 
175 Microsoft Corp. v. At&T Corp., 550 U.S.437 (2007). The Court decided United States patent law, specifically 
Section 27(f) of the Patent Act of 1984 does not apply extraterritorially. Changing economic practices may propel 
further development on software distribution, but this falls within the purview of the legislature. 
176 The executive branch’s responsibility for foreign affairs was the subject of numerous cases before the Supreme 
Court. The most notable are” Haig v. Agee 453 U.S. 280  (1981) & Department of Navy v. Egan 484 U.S. 518 (1980). 
For further discussion See, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF U.S FOREIGN POLICY (David 
Adler & Larry Georges eds., 1996) at 1, 6 & H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs 67 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 576 (1999). 
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which, when applied abroad, may impact foreign policy.177  In this manner, the majority 
established the relevance of the doctrine of presumption against extraterritoriality.  
Having justified the presumption against extraterritoriality, the majority then countered the 
plaintiff’s claims that the “text, history, and purpose of the ATS” rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.178 They addressed each issue in turn. Textually, the majority focused two 
points related to the drafters’ word choice. First, they discussed the phrase “any civil action” and 
whether it implies acceptance of torts committed abroad.179 However, they cite previous 
decisions,180 which found the use of such generic terms fails to dispel the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Second, they examined the drafters’ choice of the term “tort”, and its 
relationship to the common law doctrine of transitory torts. The majority spent little time 
addressing this question because they dismissed the doctrine of transitory torts as irrelevant to 
the question raised in Kiobel.181 For them, the question of the character of a tort is immaterial to 
establishing jurisdiction under the ATS because it is solely a jurisdictional statute. The majority 
did not reconcile the inconsistencies in its legal reasoning. First, it applied the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to the ATS despite its jurisdictional nature because it bore enough 
similarities to a statute creating a cause of action. In the next section of the decision, the majority 
dismissed the applicability of the transitory torts doctrine because a transitory tort would create a 
cause of action. This reasoning is internally incoherent but allowed the majority to dismiss the 
doctrine of transitory torts with just a cursory examination.  
The majority’s analysis of the history and purpose of the ATS was more extensive and 
intertwined the two concepts. Drawing on the historical survey of late eighteenth century 
international law chronicled in the Sosa decision,182 they elucidate three principal offenses 
constituting violations of the law of nations at the time: violations of safe conduct, assault on the 
person of ambassadors, and piracy. These violations were first identified in the Blackstone 
 
177 Supra note 12. 
178 Id at 1666. 
179 Supra note 5. 
180 Supra note 12. The Court cites its decisions in Small v. United States, 544 U. S. 385, 388 (2005) & Foley Bros., Inc. 
v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 287 (1949) at 1666. 
181 Id 
182 Supra note 30 at 723, 724. The content of law of nations will be discussed further in Chapter V. 
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Commentaries183 and subsequently relied upon in both Kiobel184 and Sosa.185 The opinion states 
that violations of safe conduct and the assault on the person of ambassadors are, by their nature, 
offenses which can only occur domestically. It notes the 1784 attack on the French Minister 
Plenipotentiary and the 1787 incurrence into the home of the Dutch Ambassador as the impetus 
behind the drafting of the ATS.186  They linked the combination of historic events 
contemporaneous to the drafting of the ATS and the first two violations of the law of nations in 
the eighteenth century, finding extraterritorial application unnecessary for enforcement. 
The third violation of the law of nations identified by Blackstone,187 piracy, was more 
challenging for the majority. They conceded that piracy primarily occurred on the high seas, an 
area traditionally considered by courts to be outside U.S. territory. The presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws on the high seas was a factor in a previous ATS case, 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping. In that case, the Supreme Court found a 
provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act inapplicable because the action in question 
occurred on the high seas.188  However, the Kiobel majority proposed that crimes of piracy 
constituted a “cause unto themselves” for two reasons.189 First, pirates operate outside the 
territory of and without any sovereign’s consent. This minimizes the risk of foreign policy 
consequences.190 Second, Blackstone made a similar comment, albeit in a different context. He 
claimed pirates “were fair game … a category unto themselves”,191 and thus subject to the 
jurisdiction of any state which captured them. While Blackstone’s statement appears to support 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the crime of piracy, the Kiobel majority uses the statement to 
support the idea that an undefined, specialized regime governed the crime of piracy. The 
majority held that the ATS’ applicability to the crime of piracy represents a legal anomaly 
insufficient to rebut the doctrine of the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
 
183 4 W. Blackstone. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769). 
184 Supra note 12 at 1667. 
185 Supra note 30 at 715. 
186 Supra note 12 at 1667. 
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The final element of the majority opinion addressed the intentions of the ATS drafters, and the 
legal question which gave rise to disagreement within the majority. The majority agreed that the 
drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not intend to make the U.S. uniquely hospitable to the 
enforcement of international law.192 The ATS was likely included to provide federal jurisdiction 
in light of the previous injury to foreign ambassadors rather than with an intention to provide 
oversight over international norms for two reasons. First, the opinion noted the relative weakness 
of the U.S. in the late eighteenth century. The U.S. would have lacked the military or diplomatic 
power to enforce international norms or have its international laws penetrate the territory of other 
sovereigns. The majority further relies on an 1822 Massachusetts court judgment, which 
explicitly states that the U.S. did not intend to become uniquely hospitable for adjudicating 
international norms.193 The Alito and Thomas concurrence,194 and the Kennedy concurrence,195 
depict the range of views within the majority opinion. Both rely on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, but the latter questions whether this presumption is absolute. Kennedy 
concedes that certain extraterritorial cases may fall within the scope of the ATS, leaving the door 
open for potentially broader interpretations in the future.  
A.2.   Minority Opinion 
 
The concurring minority opinion, which was authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices 
Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, agreed with the majority’s conclusion but not their reasoning. 
The minority did not find the presumption against the extraterritoriality applicable to the ATS. 
They endorsed an approach that draws heavily on foreign relations law and outlined three 
categories of cases which should fall under ATS jurisdiction: when the alleged tort occurred on 
U.S. territory, when the defendant is a U.S. national, or when the “defendant’s conduct 
substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest.”196 The opinion 
highlights that one important national interest is ensuring the U.S. does not provide safe refuge 
for the “common enemy of mankind.”197 It proposes a wider of reading of the ATS’s scope than 
 
192 Id. 
193 Supra note 12 at 1668. The full quote reads: “No nation has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum of the 
whole world.” The Court cites United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (No. 15,551) (CC. Mass. 
1822). 
194 Supra note 112. 
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the majority, clearly envisioning some extraterritorial applicability but certainly not envisioning 
universal jurisdiction. In Kiobel, they agreed that the link between RDPC and STTC and the U.S. 
was too tenuous to substantially and adversely impact U.S. interests. 
The minority contested the majority’s decision to impose the presumption against 
extraterritoriality on the ATS, which they found to be at odds with the Court’s previous decision 
in Sosa. Central to that decision was the definition of the ATS as jurisdictional in nature, 
establishing a mechanism for obtaining permanent redress for violations of a finite number of 
international norms.198 Since the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to actions 
occurring abroad, not questions of jurisdiction, the minority rejected it as the applicable law 
governing the ATS. The minority noted the majority’s awkward attempt to situate their decision 
with the crime of piracy. Both opinions acknowledged piracy was considered a breach of the law 
of nations when the ATS was drafted.199 While the majority emphasizes that the crime of piracy 
occurs on high seas, it ignores the reality that the actual criminal actions committed by pirates, be 
it murder or robbery, occur on board the ships they seek to claim. The minority focuses on the 
well-established principle of international maritime law that a ship falls within the jurisdiction of 
the state whose flag it flies.200 Thus, they held that the ATS was enacted in reaction to the 
existence of both domestic and extraterritorial crimes that give rise to tortuous injury. After 
establishing the drafters intended the ATS to apply extraterritorially, the minority focuses on the 
necessary link between the alleged tortuous action and U.S. interests. I discuss their proposed 
threshold in Chapter V. 
   B. Legal Inconsistencies  
The Kiobel decision contained a number of legal inconsistencies, which are most evident in the 
majority opinion. The minority drew attention to some of these inconsistencies, particularly 
regarding the majority’s inability to reconcile its decision with historic maritime law or previous 
ATS precedent. In Subsection B.1, I focus on the majority’s definition of piracy, which is at odds 
with the international norm and domestic precedent. In the Subsection B.2, I discuss how the 
majority’s reliance on the presumption against extraterritoriality relies on a specific 
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understanding of “U.S. interests” and ignores how lower courts had grappled weighed competing 
U.S. interests in decades-worth of ATS jurisprudence. However, the majority does not explicitly 
overturn these cases, leaving it the responsibility of lower courts to balance this contraction. 
Legally, the Kiobel approach raises more questions than it answers. 
 
 B.1.   Piracy and the Law of Nations 
The Kiobel majority supported their decision to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality 
to the ATS despite its jurisdictional nature. They did so by claiming that the three eighteenth 
century violations law of nations envisioned by the drafters of the ATS were not extraterritorial. 
As a result, they reasoned that drafters intended the ATS to only establish jurisdiction for 
tortuous acts committed in the U.S. However, this contradicts the Court’s own previous decision 
in Sosa,201 which interpreted the ATS as establishing redress for victims of piracy. Defining the 
content of the law of nations as applicable to the ATS was a central tenant of the Sosa decision. 
Before Sosa, there was considerable academic debate on the applicability of CIL as a source of 
law federal common law and the process for ascertaining the existence of such CIL.202 The Sosa 
majority held that the ATS drafters intended the Statute apply to a narrow range of actions akin 
to violations of the eighteenth-century law of nations.203 Both the Blackstone commentaries and 
the Sosa decision held that piracy was considered a violation of the law of nations when the ATS 
was drafted,204 which implies an extraterritorial intent for the Statute. The majority focused on 
the fact that piracy occurred on the high seas as opposed to within the territory of another 
sovereign. As the minority noted,205 this approached ignored that the actual crimes committed by 
the pirates occurred aboard ships, which operate under the jurisdiction of the sovereign whose 
flag they fly. Thus the crime of piracy occurs within the territory of another sovereign, not on the 
high seas. 
 
201 Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Act 107 AJIL 13, 26 
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The principle attributing a vessel’s nationality to the flag-state is a well-defined norm of 
international law and was affirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus 
case. The Court stated that “a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the State the 
flag of which it flies.”206 This principle is codified in Article 92 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,207 and the Supreme Court considers this Article part of 
CIL.208 This principle was also the subject of numerous domestic court cases cited by the 
minority.209 For example, in the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court stated that a crime 
committed within the jurisdiction of a state and a crime committed onboard a state’s vessel were 
of the same nature.210 Thus foreign policy considerations and the domestic legislation of other 
sovereigns impacts piracy despite the majority’s assertion otherwise. The majority’s failure to 
discuss the nature of piracy as occurring in another sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction undercuts 
their claims that the ATS drafters intended to confer jurisdiction solely for domestic acts.  
 B.2.   Understanding of U.S. Foreign Policy  
The Kiobel decision also selectively discussed the foreign policy considerations associated with 
ATS jurisdiction. This factors into all four concurring opinions but is particularly central to the 
majority opinion, which begins with a selective reiteration of a particular narrative of U.S. 
history. The majority viewed the U.S. in the eighteenth century as lacking the power to enforce 
international law norms abroad.211 They assumed Congress would have enacted legislation more 
specific than the ATS if Congress intended the Statute apply extraterritorially.212  The Kiobel 
majority repeatedly states that the Court should not infringe on the congressional and executive 
branches’ purview, yet it proceeds to claim it speaks on behalf of the eighteenth century 
Congress. This inconsistency is not addressed in the decision, but the majority’s choice to adopt 
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this historic line of reasoning is a political choice. The Sosa majority held that the ATS was not 
enacted with the intent that subsequent legislatures needed to enact more specific legislation. It 
was created with practical effect in mind.213 This contradicts the majority’s assertion that 
Congress would have needed to enact more specific legislation to cover torts committed abroad. 
Another narrative claims that, as a relatively weak nation, the U.S. would have placed additional 
emphasis on compliance with international norms, particularly the prohibition of piracy, to 
protect itself from more powerful nations.214 There is a considerable body of evidence that the 
ATS was drafted primarily to address international concerns not domestic considerations.215 The 
minority found evidence the ATS drafters intended the statute to have a certain degree of 
extraterritorial reach,216 thus casting some doubt on the majority’s assumptions. It is possible, if 
not probable, that the drafters of the ATS intended the Statute to have considerable 
extraterritorial reach, as they hoped to provide financial recourse for violations of international 
law, rather than extraterritorial enforcement. Again, the majority presents as fact what is really a 
selective and disputed history of the ATS and the intent of its drafters. 
The majority invokes the presumption against extraterritoriality on the grounds that it protects 
against unjust judicial interference in foreign affairs.217 This fails to address how lower courts 
had previously balanced foreign policy considerations in their decisions. Since Filartiga, courts 
have weighed U.S. foreign policy interests as articulated by the executive branch and other 
states’ interests through the “political questions doctrine”.218 In Sosa, the majority advocated for 
weighing on a case-by-case basis foreign policy concerns when a case is brought under the ATS. 
It did not bar courts from hearing politically contentious cases.219 For example, lower courts have 
dismissed cases involving corporate support for Israeli occupation of Palestine because of the 
foreign policy implications.220 The Second Circuit Court also dismissed the ATS case against 
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Dow Chemical for producing Agent Orange under the political questions doctrine.221 Prior to 
Kiobel, courts assessed the foreign policy ramifications of ATS jurisprudence on a case-by-case 
basis. One manner in which courts balanced foreign policy considerations is considering the 
amici curiae briefs submitted by defendants’ governments. The Second Circuit Court’s decision 
in Balintulo222 focused on the South African government’s position. In the initial stages of the 
case, South Africa submitted an amicus curiae brief opposing the plaintiff’s case, because it 
could impede the domestic reconciliation process and destabilize U.S.-South African relations. 
However, South Africa officially changed its stance in 2013, triggering judicial reconsideration 
largely because the foreign policy considerations had changed. While extraterritorial actions may 
create friction between the U.S. judicial and executive branches or between the U.S. and 
defendants’ states, a blanket ban on such cases is unnecessary to respect the separation of powers 
because it is possible to weigh these considerations on a case-by-case basis. 
There is also related concern that the international community viewed the ATS with suspicion,223 
particularly in light of the U.S. aversion to other extraterritorial judicial mechanisms, such as the 
International Criminal Court. However, this is not always the case. As discussed above, the 
South African government considered the U.S. federal court system an appropriate forum for 
civil redress. The amici curiae briefs submitted by the U.K. and Dutch governments did not call 
into question the validity of the ATS, its extraterritorial applicability, or the possibility of 
corporate liability under the ATS. In their view, the Kiobel defendants simply lacked sufficient 
ties to the U.S. and the case could better be pursued through domestic legal channels. They 
believed the ATS should create jurisdiction for other extraterritorial cases, provided there was a 
closer link between the defendant and the U.S.224 Though the majority in Kiobel presents the 
foreign policy consequences of ATS litigation as central to invoking the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the majority does not acknowledge that courts have weighed these 
consequences against the need to redress IHRL violations for decades. The majority neglects to 
justify this switch from a case-by-case balancing of foreign policy considerations to a blanket 
ban against extraterritoriality.  
 
221 Supra note 149. 
222 Balintulo v. Daimler 727 F. 3d. 174 (2013). 
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    C. Political Considerations 
In this Section I argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel failed to engage with the 
political questions surrounding the case and the ramifications of its decision. In Subsection C.1, I 
discuss the domestic politics associated with the presumption against extraterritoriality and the 
interests privileged by the Court’s decision. In Subsection C.2., I analyze extraterritoriality in 
international law and how various regimes of international law attempt to address the question. 
Despite the Court’s failure to explicitly acknowledge these political considerations, I argue 
Kiobel is best understood as part of a trend within international law to immunize corporations 
from legal accountability for breaches IHRL and environmental law they perpetrate or 
encourage. This, in turn, reflects a conscious decision to privilege capital at the expense of 
human rights. 
 C.1.   Domestic Politics of Extraterritoriality  
The question of extraterritoriality is central both to establishing the parameters of the ATS and to 
adjudicating violations of IHRL at the state level. Regarding the parameters of the ATS, there is 
concern that adjudicating human rights through the U.S court system impinges on other 
country’s sovereignty, particularly those in the global South.225 Another concern is whether the 
ATS represents an unconstitutional judicial overreach that endangers U.S. foreign policy.226 This 
school of thought argues that it is Congress or the executive branch, not a court, which should 
decide the content of the “law of nations”, given its political sensitivities and impact on U.S. 
foreign policy. These debates are alluded to by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel but are 
not directly discussed by a Court, which assumes as given the need for a narrow scope for 
litigation under the ATS. 
The majority does not concern itself with impinging on the sovereignty of other states. As it 
stands now, the ATS neither creates unlimited jurisdiction, nor does it offer redress for all 
imaginable IHRL breaches perpetrated anywhere. Jurisprudence trends towards severely limiting 
 
225 Supra note 10 & Supra note 91. 
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the cases which fall under the ATS, not toward expanding jurisdiction.227 However, the majority 
briefly mentions concerns that other states will enact legislation similar to the ATS and “hale 
[sic] our [U.S.] citizens into their courts for alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in 
the United States or anywhere else in the world.”228 Underlying this statement is the assumption 
that such a sequence of events would be a negative trend in international law. Relying on this 
assumption, the Court ignores the counterargument that expanding the scope of the ATS, and 
indeed other countries enacting similar legislation, could ameliorate one of the chief criticisms of 
IHRL. As previously discussed, TWAIL scholars have criticized IHRL when confined only to 
allegations against those in the global South,229 ignoring violations by those in the North. In 
Kiobel, the plaintiffs did not seek redress from the Nigerian government or those employed by 
the state to quell descent in Ogoniland. Instead, they brought a case against the corporations 
which profited, directly or indirectly, from the IHRL violations committed by the Nigerian state; 
and whose corporate interests necessitated the violations.230  
This approach could reorient the IHRL discourse towards multinational corporations and 
shareholders whose create wealth through the suffering of others and destruction of the natural 
environment, beginning with opening the U.S. federal court system to cases against corporations. 
If other states followed suit, there would be increased adherence to IHRL, because corporate 
executives would fear being hauled into a foreign court and the financial risks. In any case, the 
Court’s assumption that limiting ATS jurisprudence will prevent other states from enacting 
similar legislation does not follow. More importantly, absent from the decision is a fuller 
discussion or assessment of what constitutes U.S. interests. While multinational corporations 
may support this approach,231 it does not follow that it is in the best interests of the U.S., and 
other viewpoints including the importance of protecting human rights, also merit consideration. 
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          C.2.   International Politics of Extraterritoriality 
At the international level, the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction remains contested. The 
majority opinion in Kiobel asserted that no country has tried to act as custos morum, the world’s 
morality police.232 This approach ignores developments in international criminal law, 
international environmental law, and private international law which embrace certain forms of 
extraterritoriality. The minority opinion in Kiobel discusses extraterritoriality in international 
criminal law,233 while scholars have developed other lines of argument focused on environmental 
and private international law. The fragmentation and indeterminacy of international law allows 
the Kiobel majority to selectively engage with extraterritoriality. This in turn allows the majority 
to categorically assert that the ATS could not have intended to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction without a thorough discussion of international law.  
The minority opinion challenged the majority’s understanding of extraterritoriality with regards 
to IHRL and international criminal law.234 Where the majority found historic and contemporary 
international consensus opposing extraterritorial jurisdiction, the minority opinion approached 
the situation differently. Beginning with piracy in the eighteenth century, states have 
acknowledged that certain acts are so heinous, their perpetrators are viewed as the common 
enemy of mankind. Historically, states were under an obligation not to provide safe harbor to 
these hostis humani generis and prosecute their crimes.235 The minority opinion cites Filartiga 
and Sosa as precedent while arguing that certain IHRL violators,236 such as the torturer, the 
committer of genocide, and the slave trader, are the modern equivalent of the pirate. In their brief 
survey of extraterritoriality in treaty and in international practice, the minority supports their 
assertion that extraterritorial jurisdiction for certain IHRL violations was commonplace. The 
opinion noted that the U.S. had signed and ratified many international conventions that included 
the obligation to find and prosecute perpetrators of serious crimes.237 When examining state 
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practice, the minority observed that a growing number of countries established “universal” 
jurisdiction for perpetrators of genocide or agents of torture,238 including imposing civil awards 
during criminal proceedings.  
The minority approach is consistent with more comprehensive studies on universal criminal 
jurisdiction. In a 2012 survey of universal jurisdiction and domestic legislation, Amnesty 
International found that 147 countries had enacted some form of legislation to create universal 
jurisdiction for war crimes or crimes against humanity.239 While the ATS, as a jurisdictional civil 
law statute, does not seek to impose criminal responsibility, its defendants stand accused of the 
same violations of IHRL. By enacting the TVPA, the U.S. Congress acknowledged that redress 
for torture victims and descendants of victims of extrajudicial killings should be available even 
in cases where the acts were committed extraterritorially between aliens.240 It follows that the 
ATS could provide a similar redress for other violations of IHRL with a similar character, 
including those which would give rise to universal criminal jurisdiction. The Kiobel minority 
examined the regimes of IHRL and international criminal law and observed the existence of 
certain extraterritorial jurisdictional norms not addressed by the majority. 
Neither opinion glances beyond the field of IHRL to other fields of international laws’ 
engagement with extraterritorial jurisdiction. In many ways, this reflects the false divide between 
the fields of and within branches international law discussed in Kennedy’s work.241 One 
potentially relevant regime left undiscussed is international environmental law. There have been 
numerous attempts to bring cases involving environmental damage under the ATS,242 although 
none have been successful. The Kiobel plaintiffs initially argued the destruction of their 
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environment violated their right to life, but the District Court found the right to life lacked the 
specificity required of CIL and dismissed the charge.243 However, liability for transnational 
pollution is an already established principle of international law.244 The principle that the polluter 
pays for damage meets the “specific, universal, and obligatory” criteria the Sosa decision 
established for assessing CIL.245 This norm was applied by numerous international judicial 
bodies and arguably could be a cause of action for ATS litigation.246 The environmental law 
regime would be more hospitable for plaintiffs if courts use the principle that “the polluter pay” 
for damages. International environmental law is also more decisive on the question of 
multinational corporations’ conduct and is aware environmental damage is usually caused by 
private actors.247 This would be useful for answering the question of corporate liability left 
unaddressed by the Kiobel majority, because the polluter pays principle focuses on causality. 
Addressing the questions raised by the ATS through international environmental law would 
provide an understanding of liability for extraterritorial damages and corporate liability which 
favors the plaintiffs’ interests. 
The majority borrowed the presumption against extraterritoriality from laws that create causes of 
action, rather than laws that establish jurisdiction.248 To do this, the majority relied primarily on 
cases involving U.S. securities and employment law.249 However, the Court did not consider 
private international law on corporate liability for torts.250 Additionally, the decision of 
corporations to enact voluntary IHRL codes of conduct,251 the work of the United Nations and 
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nongovernmental organizations,252 and the European Union253 have all indicated the increasing 
importance of corporate responsibility in private law. In advocating for better, more humane 
business practices, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights referred to the 
extraterritorial application of domestic legislation as one possible avenue to pursue.254  While this 
likely falls short of CIL, Kiobel did not consider these principles or developments. As a result, 
both the majority and minority opinions skirt relevant developments in international law more 
hospitable to ATS jurisprudence. Damage occurring extraterritorially becomes relegated to 
damnum absque injuria.  
The majority approach in Kiobel relied on the presumption against extraterritorial application for 
domestic legislation, which is not normally applicable to purely jurisdictional statutes. Their line 
of argument relied on a specific historic understanding of the drafting of the ATS, an 
understanding of the crime of piracy inconsistent with domestic precedent and international law, 
and a lack of engagement with previous ATS precedent. In doing so, the majority privileged the 
interests of multinational corporations without addressing the concerns raised by Judge Leval 
and other supporters of the ATS, namely whether immunizing corporate conduct abroad was in 
U.S. interests. The decision did not take into account the manner in which previous courts had 
reconciled U.S. foreign policy interests and the interests of victims of human rights violations. It 
also failed to address developments in international criminal, environmental, and private law, all 
fields with a growing acceptance of extraterritorial jurisdiction in certain circumstances. This 
approach considerably narrowed the Statute’s jurisdictional reach, but did not prohibit all 
extraterritorial applicability. In Chapter V, I examine majority and minority thresholds for 
establishing the necessary nexus with the U.S. to bring an ATS claim. I argue that these 
thresholds lack clear criteria but have consistently been decided in favor of the defendants. 
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V. Threshold of Link to the United States 
In Chapter V, I discuss the link between extraterritorial actions and the U.S. that is needed to 
establish jurisdiction under the ATS. The majority and minority opinions advocated for different 
thresholds, and there was a clear disagreement even within the majority. However, both 
approaches held that the ATS applied only in cases where the cause of action occurred in the 
U.S. or significantly impacted U.S. interests. All agreed that Kiobel did not sufficiently impact 
U.S. interests. Despite the Court’s agreement on Kiobel, the process of defining the threshold 
needed to dispel the presumption against extraterritoriality is not easy. The majority spent little 
time discussing why Kiobel failed to overcome the presumption, and its passing reference to the 
insufficiency of “mere corporate presence”255 provides little guidance. However, it did not 
categorically declare all extraterritorial actions outside the scope of the ATS. Courts since Kiobel 
have interpreted the threshold in different ways, the majority of which favored the corporate 
defendant. Nearly always, the impact of the threshold is borne by plaintiffs, but the threshold’s 
ambiguity offers hope that the Court could adopt a more pro-plaintiff approach at a later date. 
In Section A, I present the Supreme Court’s arguments on the nexus between the U.S. and the 
extraterritorial tortuous action needed bring a case under ATS. Subsection A.1 discusses the 
majority’s “touch and concern with significant force” threshold. In subsection A.2, I examine the 
divisions within the majority based on the concurring opinions submitted by Justices Alito and 
Thomas and Justice Kennedy. In Section A.3, I analyze the minority’s approach and the three-
pronged test it imagines. Section B assesses whether there are legal inconsistencies. Subsection 
B.1 discusses the Kiobel threshold’s relationship with previous ATS jurisprudence involving 
extraterritorial violations of IHRL. In Subsection B.2, I look at the ambiguous wording of the 
threshold and the differing approaches lower courts have employed when applying the “touch 
and concern with significant force” threshold.256 In Section C, I discuss the political questions 
and ramifications of this approach. Subsection C.1. argues that this threshold is consistent with 
the Court’s approach in Sosa, creating new thresholds to decrease ATS litigation. In Subsection 
C.2, I present the ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel in terms of cases 
dismissed and awards vacated.  
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   A. Content of the Supreme Court’s Decision 
A.1   Majority Opinion 
After presenting its argument in favor of the presumption against extraterritoriality, the majority 
turned toward the necessary relationship between an alleged tortuous action and the U.S. It 
presents its threshold in the final paragraph of the decision, which reads  
All the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where the claims 
touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force 
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are often 
present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence 
suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS 
would be required.257 
This paragraph implies that conduct occurring in the U.S. would be approached differently, but 
that the extraterritorial Kiobel conduct was not in this category. This approach provides a caveat 
to earlier sections of the judgment which appeared prepared to preclude any extraterritorial 
actions from the scope of the ATS. The majority states that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality could be overcome if the acts touch and concern U.S. territory with sufficient 
force. However, the Court does not indicate what it means by “touch and concern” or 
“significant force,” leaving them open for interpretation. It is clear that corporate presence alone 
is insufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.258 It is also clear that 
sufficient ties to the U.S. may give rise to jurisdiction under the ATS. In the absence of criteria 
for assessing this threshold, lower courts and academics are left to speculate as to the majority’s 
intentions and whether the facts of a specific case meet the threshold. Part of the ambiguity 
surrounding the Kiobel majority’s threshold may be explained by the divergence within the 
majority and the differing threshold adopted by the minority. 
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 A.2.   Concurrent Majority Opinions 
Three justices who joined the Roberts-authored majority opinion submitted concurring opinions 
clarifying their stances on the decision’s final paragraph. The Alito and Thomas concurrence,259 
and the Kennedy concurrence,260 underscore the divergent views within the majority as to the 
relationship between extraterritorial tortuous acts and the U.S. The former held that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality renders all actions undertaken abroad inadmissible for 
establishing ATS jurisdiction. The opinion indicates they believed the ATS establishes a cause of 
action only in cases where the tortuous breach of the law of nations occurs on U.S. territory.261 
The domestic action itself must amount to a violation of an international law norm meeting the 
Sosa standard of specificity and universality. According to their approach, any actions which 
occur on foreign territory, regardless of the actor’s relationship to the U.S., would fall outside the 
scope of the ATS. It also appears that Justices Thomas and Alito would consider allegations that 
a U.S.-based corporation aided and abetted extraterritorial IHRL violations or provided material 
assistance to those who committed the actions insufficient to dispel the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. In such cases, or in cases where the decision-making process occurs in U.S. 
territory, Alito and Thomas focus on the location of the actions. If a U.S-based corporation 
decided to engage in or encourage acts of torture abroad in violation of the law of nations, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality would still apply. The Alito-Thomas approach narrowly 
reads the ATS as applicable only for breaches of international law committed domestically. 
Justice Kennedy’s brief concurring opinion adopted a different approach. Kennedy began by 
specifying a desire to further develop the relationship between extraterritoriality and the ATS, He 
emphasized that the majority’s decision is sufficiently vague to allow for this development of 
ATS jurisprudence. He hypothesized that a case involving serious violations of international law 
dissimilar to the facts of Kiobel and not covered by TVPA would require additional examination 
as to the correct application of the presumption against extraterritoriality.262 This formulation is 
important for two reasons. First, he considers that Congress granted the federal courts 
jurisdiction to redress many of the worst violations of IHRL when they enacted the TVPA. This 
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is the closest a member of the Kiobel majority comes to addressing the chain of ATS 
jurisprudence that previously addressed extraterritorial torture cases. As discussed in Chapter II, 
courts have conceptualized the relationship between the TVPA and the ATS differently,263 and 
Justice Kennedy appears to be of the school that views the TVPA as lex specialis for cases 
involving torture committed outside the U.S. Second, he leaves the door open for a case in which 
a violation of the law of nations committed outside the U.S. could dispel the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. In this regard, he does not view the majority’s decision as a blanket ban on 
ATS cases concerning extraterritorial conduct. Rather, he appears to take a very situational 
approach: Just because the facts in the Kiobel case lacked sufficient ties to the U.S., does not 
mean every case involving extraterritorial conduct will also lack these ties. In this regard, his 
concurrence endorsed the majority’s application of the presumption against extraterritoriality to 
the ATS, but shares the minority’s belief that, in certain circumstances, extraterritorial human 
rights violations could impact the U.S. enough that the ATS should establish jurisdiction without 
running afoul of the Kiobel precedent. 
 A.3.   Minority Opinion 
In proposing their own approach to limiting the scope of the ATS, the minority underscored the 
need to acknowledge that certain extraterritorial violations of the law of nations adversely impact 
U.S. interests. As discussed in Chapter IV, the opinion posited a three-pronged test for 
jurisdiction under the ATS: cases when the defendant was a U.S. national, when the alleged 
tortuous action occurred within U.S. territory, or when the defendant’s conduct substantially and 
adversely affects an important U.S. national interest. The minority went on to clarify that one 
U.S. interest is to avoid becoming a safe harbor, free from criminal responsibility and civil 
liability, for persons who violate certain basic international norms.264 They draw on the hostis 
humanis generis analogy employed by the Second Circuit Court in Filartiga,265and the Supreme 
Court in Sosa,266 to underscore that it is in U.S. interests to ensure persons who commit certain 
breaches of IHRL are punished even if those actions occur extraterritorially.267 Under the ATS, 
the punishment is monetary damages as opposed to criminal penalty, but the victims receive 
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some form of redress. Despite the minority’s lengthy discussion of this three-pronged 
understanding of the ATS, two questions remain. First, does the court consider that U.S.-based 
corporations have nationality for the purpose of the ATS? Second, in the case of a tort committed 
by an alien outside the U.S., what is the threshold for “substantially and adversely affects an 
important American national interest” as envisioned by the minority?268 Their analysis of the 
events in Kiobel provides some guidance but not enough to determine their criteria’s threshold. 
In Kiobel, the minority found the relationship between the defendants and the U.S. too remote to 
justify ATS jurisdiction. In the eyes of these Justices, the defendants’ connection the U.S. was 
minimal. STTC maintained a New York office for the purpose of meeting clients and RDPC and 
STTC traded their stock on the New York Stock Exchange. The minority further distinguished 
between allegations that a defendant had engaged in acts of torture or genocide and allegations 
defendants had assisted foreign nationals in committing these acts.269 The latter, as in Kiobel, 
would not fall within the scope of the ATS because it insufficiently impacts U.S. interests. 
Importantly, the minority appears to consider that case in which a foreign defendant committed, 
rather than aided and abetted, certain IHRL violations abroad, could fall within the jurisdictional 
scope of the ATS. The minority in Kiobel ultimately reached the same conclusion as the majority 
and dismissed the case, but it understood the ATS to establish jurisdiction for a wider range of 
extraterritorial violations of the law of nations. 
B. Legal Inconsistencies 
   B.1.   Kiobel and Previous ATS Jurisprudence 
The Kiobel majority does not reconcile its “touch and concern with significant force” threshold 
with previous ATS jurisprudence. The parameters of the ATS have been entirely dictated by 
jurisprudence, and the Second Circuit Court’s 1981 decision in Filartiga serves as the 
cornerstone of this jurisprudence. The Supreme Court is not bound by the Second Circuit Court’s 
decision in Filartiga, but prior ATS cases decided by the Supreme Court have reconciled 
themselves with this landmark decision. While the majority aligned its decision with the Sosa 
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precedent, 270 it says little about the body of ATS cases which came before Sosa. This is a 
marked departure from prior Supreme Court decisions and from the Kiobel minority’s approach. 
In first ATS case decided by the Supreme Court, Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corporation,271 the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist began with a short discussion 
of the ATS. Though the Court decided Amerada Hess in favor of the defendant, they referred 
explicitly to Filartiga as a guiding principle in ATS decisions. Similarly, the majority’s approach 
in Sosa,272 penned by Justice Souter, invested considerable time aligning this decision with the 
Second Circuit Court’s decision in Filartiga. By drawing comparisons between the eighteenth 
century pirate and the modern day torturer, Souter reconciled the Sosa decision with Filartiga 
despite narrowing the scope of the ATS. The Kiobel minority also reconciled their three-pronged 
understanding of what cases should be heard under the ATS. Like the Sosa majority, they relied 
on the pirate-torturer analogy and held that certain violations of the law of nations are grave 
enough to give rise to extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ATS.273 The Kiobel minority states 
that “Sosa referred to [the Filartiga decision] positively,”274 and takes time to situate their 
decision with Filartiga. The majority in Kiobel, however, does not address how Filartiga and its 
descendants should be understood in light of Kiobel’s threshold on extraterritoriality.  
Factually, there are a number of similarities between Filartiga and Kiobel, as both appear to 
address “foreign-cubed” situations. Legal analysts often borrow the term “foreign-cubed” or 
“foreign-squared” from international securities law, in large part because it is the field where the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is most often applied. The Supreme Court defines the term 
foreign-cubed as “transnational [securities] lawsuits involving claims against foreign defendants 
by foreign investors trading in foreign markets.”275 With relation to the ATS, it is used to 
describe cases in which foreign plaintiffs bring a case against foreign defendants for an act 
committed outside the U.S. It is difficult to align the facts of Filartiga with the newly instated 
presumption against extraterritoriality. The tortuous violations of international law in that case, 
namely the torture and extrajudicial killing of Joelito Filartiga, were undertaken by a foreign 
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national inside another sovereign’s territory. According to the legal argument adopted by the 
Kiobel majority, a tortuous violation of the law of nations which occurs outside of U.S. territory 
must “touch and concern U.S. territory with significant force”276 in order to dispel the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. It appears unlikely that a case such as Filartiga, in which 
the torture and killing of a foreign national occurred abroad at the hands of a fellow 
countryperson, would create a more significant linkage than the ones between the Kiobel 
plaintiffs and defendants.277 Without guidance as to whether or not Filartiga and other ATS 
jurisprudence were decided correctly, lower courts and academics are left to speculate on how to 
handle foreign-cubed cases.   
The minority, as well as legal scholars, have attempted to ascertain the validity of the Filartiga 
and subsequent cases which rely on it. The minority constructed a line of argument which drew a 
comparison between the pirates of the eighteenth century and the contemporary torturer, an 
approach previously used in Filartiga and Sosa.278 The pirate and its contemporary equivalent 
are hostis humanis generis, the enemy of all humankind, and thus it is sufficiently in the U.S. 
interest to not provide safe haven to such individuals. The Kiobel minority endorsed the Filartiga 
decision that the ATS established jurisdiction for foreign-cubed tortuous actions committed by 
human beings while differentiating it from the facts of Kiobel. They distinguish between the 
allegations against the defendant in Filartiga, direct engagement in acts of torture and 
extrajudicial killing, and the defendants in Kiobel, corporations alleged to have aided another 
foreign entity engage in acts of torture and genocide.279 Only in the former case do the 
defendant’s actions impact a significant enough U.S. interest to fall within the scope of the ATS. 
In this manner, the minority retains the Filartiga precedent while differentiating its substantive 
legal question from that of Kiobel. 
Scholars have questioned how to reconcile the majority’s decision in Kiobel with Filartiga and 
its descendants. Organizations which regularly represent ATS plaintiffs, such as the Central for 
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Constitutional Rights and Amnesty International,280 correctly deplore Kiobel as a marked point 
of departure from thirty years of cases which relied on Filartiga as precedent. Conversely, those 
that promote a narrow scope for the ATS may critique the majority for not directly overruling 
Filartiga, leaving room for future Supreme Courts to align Kiobel with previous decisions.281 As 
the Seventh Circuit Court noted,282 no court had previously dismissed an ATS case based on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. In this regard, the majority’s choice not to explain the 
relationship between its “touch and concern with significant force” threshold in Kiobel and the 
decades of jurisprudence involving foreign-cubed cases is perplexing. However, by not directly 
engaging with Filartiga, the majority leaves open the possibility that under certain 
circumstances, foreign-cubed cases would meet the threshold. This is a positive development for 
potential ATS plaintiffs. If the majority had adopted the approach in Alito and Thomas’ 
concurrence, cases such as Filartiga would categorically no longer fall within the scope of the 
ATS. However, the other seven justices’ refusal to endorse this approach implies that foreign-
cubed cases do at times meet the “touch and concern with significant force” threshold. The 
majority’s choice not to explain how Kiobel is situated with regard to previous ATS 
jurisprudence, particularly Filartiga, is a marked departure from how the Court previously 
approached ATS cases. While this has caused confusion, this is significantly better for ATS 
plaintiffs than if the majority had explicitly overruled Filartiga and allowed no exceptions to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.   
 B.2.   Threshold of Link to United States  
This Subsection discusses the content of majority and minority thresholds of nexus to the U.S. 
needed to establish jurisdiction under the ATS. The two thresholds differ but both create 
uncertainty about the ATS scope, because neither threshold is clearly defined. The majority 
opinion ends with a statement that the alleged violations of IHRL in Kiobel do not touch and 
concern the U.S. with significant force to dispel the presumption against extraterritoriality.283 
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However, they do not define the content of that threshold beyond asserting that “mere corporate 
presence” was insufficient.284 The ambiguity of what the majority would a significant enough 
relationship to the U.S. to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality has been the 
subject of academic debate.285 Clegg goes as far as claiming ““no one knows how to understand 
or apply” the Kiobel decision.286 Despite the potential for confusion, the threshold’s lack of 
concreteness has its benefits for ATS plaintiffs for two reasons. First, the Kennedy concurrence 
indicates that this ambiguity is intentional to leave the door ajar for future elaboration.287 This is 
a positive development because a future Court could potentially embrace a more expansive scope 
for the ATS. Second, it rejects Alito and Thomas’ concurrence that categorically bans litigation 
under the ATS if the tortuous acts occurred outside the U.S.288 While Alito and Thomas provided 
clear content for the “touch and concern with significant force” threshold, it would have been 
disastrous for potential ATS plaintiffs and further emboldened corporations. The ambiguity of 
the majority’s threshold leaves lower courts considerable maneuvering room for determining 
how this threshold applies and allows hope that, in the future, the Supreme Court will change its 
approach. However, lower courts have, for the most part, been consistent in applying the 
threshold in favor of the defendant.   
Prior to the Court’s decision, the Second Circuit Court’s Judge Leval warned of the dangers of 
allowing corporations to retain profits earned through violations of IHRL.289 While Judge Leval 
observed this danger with regard to declaring corporate liability outside the scope of the ATS, his 
fears are equally relevant to the application of the majority’s threshold. Indeed, post-Kiobel 
jurisprudence seems inclined to permit corporate human rights violations if committed abroad. 
According to the discussion of post-Kiobel cases compiled by Basile,290 courts have mostly 
applied the “touch and concern with significant force” threshold in favor of the defendants. 
While a comprehensive survey of post-Kiobel jurisprudence falls outside the scope of this thesis, 
I want to illustrate the how the threshold has benefited ATS defendants with a few examples. In 
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Balintulo,291 the Second Circuit Court dismissed a case against Ford Motor Company executives 
because the alleged tortuous action occurred abroad. They justified this decision even though the 
defendants were U.S. nationals by relying on an understanding of Kiobel which precluded from 
the scope of the ATS all extraterritorial conduct. Similarly, in Adhikri v. Kellogg, Brown & 
Root,292 the Fifth Circuit Court considered the alleged complicity of U.S. nationals in 
extraterritorial human rights abuses insufficient to dispel the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. However, there have been a few exceptions in which lower courts have 
embraced the threshold’s ambiguity and decided in favor of the plaintiffs. In Ahmed v. Magan,293 
a district court found that the extraterritorial actions of a U.S. permanent resident fulfilled the 
“touch and concern” threshold. In Al Shimari v. CACI,294 the Fourth Circuit Court ruled that the 
corporate defender had significant enough ties to the U.S. to dispel the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. While it is challenging for plaintiffs to overcome Kiobel’s “touch and concern 
with significant force” threshold, its ambiguity has allowed for a few lower court to favor 
plaintiffs. 
The minority in Kiobel created its own threshold for the relationship needed between a defendant 
and the U.S. under the ATS, which was less ambiguous and wider in scope. The Breyer opinion 
outlined three situations for which the ATS would establish jurisdiction.295 None of the three 
situations are clear cut, and the minority also leaves room for interpretation. They appear to share 
Justice Kennedy’s belief that a more case-by-case approach is needed for ATS cases, as opposed 
to Alito and Thomas’ desires for a clear and narrow rule. The first situation, if the tortuous action 
occurs on U.S. soil, raises questions as to whether corporate executives based in the U.S. could 
be held liable for the decision to commit tortuous actions abroad. The second situation is a case 
in which the defendant is a U.S. national. This raises questions about legal versus natural 
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personhood: Whether the conduct of a U.S.-based corporation, as in the previously discussed 
Balintulo case,296 could be equated with the actions of U.S. national is debatable. The third 
situation is the least clear. The Breyer opinion explicitly stated that U.S. interests included not 
becoming a safe haven for torturers, perpetrators of genocide, or the like.297 From their analysis 
of Filartiga, the minority considered it to be a key U.S. interest to provide a judicial forum to 
hear claims against foreign nationals apprehended in the U.S. and accused of committing acts of 
torture abroad. Yet the minority does not give jurisdiction to plaintiffs suing foreign corporations 
for aiding and abetting a foreign government’s acts of torture. Neither the presence of an office 
on U.S. territory, nor presence on the New York Stock Exchange, creates a close enough link to 
the U.S. for the conduct of a foreign corporation to sufficiently impact a key U.S. interest. I can 
only speculate as to the decisions that may have followed if the minority had succeeded in 
deciding Kiobel. Despite some ambiguity, their threshold has a clearer content and envisions a 
wider scope for the ATS that the majority, so this would likely have resulted in more decisions 
favoring the plaintiff. 
The Kiobel decision is sometimes criticized for its failure to engage with previous ATS 
jurisprudence, particularly the Filartiga decision, and for not articulating the substantive content 
of its “touch and concern with significant force” threshold. The minority concurrence spends 
time highlighting these potential inconsistencies and proposes a different approach. 
Theoretically, the majority’s choice not to explain how the presumption against extraterritoriality 
would impact foreign-cubed cases such as Filartiga and its undefined threshold could have 
resulted in confusion at the lower court level. In actuality, lower courts have consistently applied 
the Kiobel precedent cautiously in a manner which favors defendants. However, there are 
exceptions in which courts have allowed jurisdiction under the ATS for extraterritorial conduct 
which they deemed to have a significant connection to the U.S. In this regard, the majority’s 
ambiguity benefits plaintiffs and prevents the sweeping ban on extraterritorial cases envisioned 
by Thomas and Alito. The door is open for a future Court to endorse an approach which 
prioritizes human rights over corporate interests, but the Kiobel precedent will remain a 
significant barrier for ATS plaintiffs. In Section C, I asses the political costs of the “touch and 
concern with significant force” threshold in terms of how it portrays the relationship between the 
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Kiobel defendants and the U.S., and I consider the experiences of plaintiffs following the 
decision. 
C. Political Considerations  
I argue that the Kiobel majority’s choice not to situate their decision in relation with previous 
ATS jurisprudence and the unclear threshold it advances is a result of political considerations. It 
is clear from the Court’s unanimous decision to uphold the Second Circuit Court’s dismissal that 
all the Justices agreed that the ATS should not establish jurisdiction for cases without a certain 
type of link to the U.S. They did not want ATS jurisdiction to extend to all alleged human rights 
abuses perpetrated or encouraged by corporations abroad. It is also clear from the decision that 
there is considerable disagreement between the Justices as to what the link to the U.S. should be. 
The one bright spot in the Kiobel decision is that, on Justice Kennedy’s insistence, the majority 
did not categorically close the door on all extraterritorial actions or on all corporate defendants. 
However, Kiobel still inflicted considerable political costs on ATS plaintiffs, and radically 
altered the balance of power in favor of corporations. In Subsection C.1, I argue the Kiobel 
decision is best understood in light of the Sosa decision, as one in a strand of judicial decisions 
aiming to narrow the scope of the ATS. Ultimately, the greatest political issue with Kiobel is its 
ramifications for ATS plaintiffs. Since the case was decided, ATS defendants have invoked the 
Kiobel precedent to claim the U.S. federal court system does not have jurisdiction over their 
case. More often than not, defendants have emerged victorious, with cases either dismissed or 
vacated. In subsection C.3, I discuss the pattern of lower court decisions after Kiobel, which 
illustrate how judges have further altered the distribution of power against plaintiffs’ interests. 
C.1.   Understanding Kiobel through Sosa  
As discussed in Chapter II, Lee and Van Schaak  classify ATS jurisprudence into three distinct 
phases.298 The first phase spans the nearly two centuries between its drafting in 1789 and 
Filartiga. The second phase encompasses the three decades of relatively successful and 
expansive jurisprudence between 1980 and the late 2000s. The final phase begins with Kiobel 
and the limitations it imposes. I argue that this third phase, one characterized by judicial 
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narrowing of the ATS scope, began in 2004 when the Supreme Court decided Sosa.299 As 
discussed in Chapter II, the Sosa case involved highly contentious political issues and the 
Supreme Court weighed into ATS jurisprudence for the first time in decades. A full analysis of 
the legal inconsistencies and political considerations in Sosa falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
However, it is the Court’s approach to ascertaining the content of the law of nations in Sosa that 
foreshadowed Kiobel’s ambiguous “touch and concern” threshold. In the Sosa era of ATS 
jurisprudence, creating such thresholds is the primary way the Supreme Court narrows the 
Statute’s applicability. 
The Sosa majority required that any court adjudicating an ATS claim rely only on principles of 
CIL that could be defined with comparable specificity to the norms of eighteenth century 
international law.300 They relied on the doctrine of the separation of powers, stating that 
Congress had not given the judiciary license to recognize new or debatable norms of CIL. Thus, 
the Court is obligated to only apply norms which are “specific, universal, and obligatory.”301 
Their subsequent analysis of whether the right to freedom from arbitrary detention fulfilled these 
criteria relied nearly entirely on state practice. Ultimately, the Court found that the right to 
freedom from arbitrary detention was an international aspiration but not a specific or universal 
norm.302 This pronouncement received considerable academic attention for two reasons.303 First, 
the Sosa process for determining whether a norm amounted to CIL placed less emphasis on 
IHRL treaties, resolutions, and government statements than the Filartiga approach had done.304 
Second, the content of the “specific, universal, and obligatory” threshold led to confusion. Did it 
only refer to norms of CIL considered jus cogens?305 Was the standard for determining the 
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modern content of the law of nations higher than determining CIL in general?306 As with the 
“touch and concern” threshold invoked by the Kiobel majority, Sosa’s threshold for determining 
the content of the law of nations “raises as many questions as answers”.307 And, as with Kiobel, 
the discourse following the case centered on whether the Court applied the law correctly, rather 
than political considerations impacting the decision. 
As discussed in subsection B.2, there are advantages to the manner in which the Court tempered 
the presumption against extraterritoriality with the “touch and concern with significant force” 
threshold.308 This leaves lower courts maneuvering space to interpret certain extrajudicial actions 
as impacting the U.S. to a degree that warrants jurisdiction under the ATS. Lower courts had the 
opportunity to interpret Kiobel in a way which better served the interests of plaintiffs. While 
“mere corporate presence” was explicitly ruled as insufficient,309 subsequent cases involved 
defendants with closer links to the U.S. than the Kiobel defendants. Without a clear definition for 
the content of the “touch and concern with significant force” threshold,310 broader interpretations 
are possible. For example, courts could have considered the U.S. interest in not providing safe 
haven for the torturer or genocide perpetrator, as advocated for by the Kiobel minority.311 Or 
courts could have considered the U.S. interest in its nationals and corporations not engaging in 
violations of IHRL abroad, for legal and ethical reasons as well as in the interest of U.S. foreign 
policy. In the vast majority of the cases, lower courts act cautiously and rely upon a conservative 
reading of Kiobel. In ATS cases, this has consistently insulated corporations from the potential 
consequences of their actions abroad.  
As with post-Sosa decisions regarding the content of the law of nations, lower courts’ adopted as 
a starting point that the Supreme Court intended to narrow the Statute’s applicability in all but 
the most exceptional cases. While lower courts have consistently invoked the Kiobel precedent in 
favor of defendants, Circuit Courts are divided on how significant the connection between the 
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U.S. and the alleged tortuous action needs to be. In Adhikari312and Balintulo,313 the Fifth Circuit 
Court and Second Circuit Court adopted the Alito-Thomas concurrence’s approach and focused 
only on the location of the alleged torts. The roles played by U.S. nationals in each case were not 
considered sufficient to dispel the presumption against extraterritoriality. This approach ignores 
Kiobel’s intentional ambiguity and the possibility that extraterritorial actions could fall within the 
scope of the ATS. Even courts which adopted a lower criterion for the “touch and concern with 
significant force” threshold applied it narrowly. In Doe v. Drummond,314 the Eleventh Circuit 
Court acknowledged that the nationality of the defendant and relationship between domestic 
conduct and acts committed abroad should be considered. However, it did so while denying the 
plaintiff’s case on the grounds that while the defendant was a U.S. national, domestic decision-
making for tortuous acts committed abroad did not meet this threshold. As lower courts apply the 
Kiobel precedent, there is a risk that these decisions will not take into account the intentional 
ambiguity included in the majority opinion  
C.2.   Ramifications for Plaintiffs 
It is impossible to fully assess the political costs of the Kiobel decision because an unknown 
number of ATS cases were never filed due to the barriers erected by the decision. It is estimated 
that attorneys have prepared thousands of ATS cases against the Ford Corporation alone, but are 
waiting to file until courts decide the question of corporate liability.315 Anyone of those cases 
could have resulted in a multimillion dollar award for the plaintiff or been settled out of court 
before judgment, as was happening before the Kiobel decision. In addition to the potential 
financial gains, these plaintiffs have yet to receive their day in court and their allegations have 
not been publicized. However, it is possible to assess the financial ramifications on the Kiobel 
plaintiffs and those involved in cases where lower courts subsequently vacated damages awarded 
prior to Kiobel. In cases where lower courts vacated previous judgments awarding financial 
damages, corporations have avoided paying millions of dollars previously awarded to plaintiffs. 
The political ramifications of the Kiobel decision are most obvious when considering what the 
plaintiffs in this case have been through. Esther Kiobel and her ten fellow plaintiffs initially filed 
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their case in 2004. First, the case against Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria was 
dismissed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976.316 Of their initial seven 
allegations against RDPC and STTC, four were dismissed by the Southern District Court for 
New York in 2006 based on the Sosa definition of the law of nations.317 On appeal, the Second 
Circuit Court dismissed the entirety of their case.318 At this point, the Court told the Kiobel 
defendants there would be no financial redress, regardless of the strength of their case, because 
CIL provided no recourse for human rights abuses perpetrated by corporations. The Supreme 
Court’s decision also held that the damaged RDPC and STTC inflicted upon the plaintiffs was 
damnum absque injuria. Since the violations of human rights law occurred in Nigeria, there 
would be no avenue for redress available in the U.S. The Supreme Court is the final judicial 
authority in the U.S. Given the impossibility of redress in the Nigerian courts, the Kiobel 
plaintiffs will never receive financial compensation for injury suffered. No damages were 
awarded for the death of Esther Kiobel’s husband and the descendants of the ten other plaintiffs. 
Worse, corporate practices which engage in or encourage human rights abuses and 
environmental destruction continue with impunity in Nigeria, in many cases emboldened by the 
Kiobel decision.  
In the past, ATS litigations pressed RDPC to provide redress to Nigerian nationals whose human 
rights were violated by its conduct. In a case settled prior to the Kiobel decision, RDPC provided 
financial redress for its actions in Ogoniland. In 2009, RDPC settled a case brought under the 
ATS by descendants of Ken Saro-Wiwa, an Ogoni activist murdered at the same time as Dr. 
Barinem Kiobel.319 The case, which alleged similar violations of the law of nations as Kiobel, 
moved through the U.S. federal court system more rapidly than Kiobel.320 On the eve of trial, 
RDPC reached a settlement with the plaintiffs in which it paid $15.5 million in damages for its 
complicity in Saro-Wiwa’s death, established the Kiisi trust for the peoples of Ogoniland,321 and 
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paid a portion of the plaintiffs’ court fees.322 This was the type of financial compensation 
available to ATS plaintiffs prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel. Owing to Kiobel’s 
institution of the presumption against extraterritoriality, it is unlikely corporations such as RDPC 
will have such an incentive to settle similar cases in the future. The Kiobel decision erected a 
barrier to ATS jurisprudence which had previously propelled corporations to reach a financial 
settlement with plaintiffs.  
The Kiobel decision also provided defendants with grounds to appeal verdicts in which awards 
were previously ordered. In these cases, courts originally decided in the plaintiffs’ favor and 
ordered corporations to pay damages. However, since the corporation committed the tortuous 
actions abroad, they now argue these judgments run contrary to the Kiobel precedent. The most 
notable example of this is the Second Circuit Court’s decision in Chowdhury v. Worldtel 
Bangladesh Holding. A jury trial awarded $1.5 million in damages from Worldtel Bangladesh 
because the corporation commissioned a Bangladeshi police officer to torture the plaintiffs.323 
The same amount of damages was also assessed against the individual police officer who 
committed the acts of torture. However, the Second Circuit Court vacated the judgment against 
Worldtel because it was contrary to the Kiobel precedent.324  
An analysis of all lower court decisions post-Kiobel falls outside the scope this research, but 
nearly all of the cases decided favor the defendant. As discussed in Sections IV.C and V.B, lower 
courts have invoked Kiobel as precedent for immunizing foreign corporations,325 domestic 
corporations operating abroad,326 and corporate executives with U.S. nationality.327 There are 
few bright spots for plaintiffs seeking redress against corporations for violations of IHRL, 
whether the corporation is U.S.-based or international. The most notable positive example is Al 
Shimari v. CACI, which concerns Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib prison.328 The defendant is a 
U.S.-based corporation contracted by the government to handle interrogations at the prison and 
allegedly committed war crimes and acts of torture. The Fourth Circuit Court reinstated the case 
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after adopting a “fact-based approach” and finding the case touched and concerned the U.S. 
sufficiently to dispel the presumption against extraterritoriality.329 A resolution to the case is still 
pending. Despite this case’s outcome, the Kiobel decision resulted in numerous dismissals of 
ATS cases, undoubtedly costing some plaintiffs financial redress and access to justice. The 
“touch and concern” threshold altered the balance of power in favor of multinational 
corporations, depriving plaintiffs of their only hope for compensation and emboldening 
corporations through rendering them unaccountable for human rights violations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
329 Id at 520. 
 72  
 
VI. Conclusion 
This thesis argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel is flawed because its results 
unjustly and unreasonably favor corporate defendants. Additionally, the Court does not explain 
its departure from previous ATS cases and its inconsistency with international legal norms. The 
decision’s poor politics and legal inadequacies result from the Court’s unwillingness to explicitly 
engage with the political ramifications of its decision. Explicit engagement with the important 
political stakes of this decision may have resulted in a more just decision. If not, at the very least, 
it would have eliminated some of the legal inconsistencies and revealed the politics of the court 
and the law. Kiobel privileges the interests of transnational corporations at the expense of the 
individuals whose human rights corporations violate in pursuit of profit. It is primarily persons 
from the global South who use the ATS as a means of redress for tortuous violations of IHRL, 
and the Kiobel decision is best understood in light of a global system which facilitates the 
extraction of resources from the South regardless of the cost. The Kiobel approach significantly 
narrowed the scope of the ATS in a manner that allowed the Court to distance itself from the 
unjust politics involved in the decision. 
Chapter II outlines the history of ATS jurisprudence and its evolution from a forgotten Statute to 
an important tool for human rights advancement. Since 2000, the majority of cases brought under 
the ATS have involved individuals from the global South seeking redress from multinational 
corporations alleged to either have perpetrated violations of IHRL or aided and abetted those 
who committed these violations outside of U.S. territory. This shift in litigation marked a new 
era for ATS jurisprudence, but U.S. courts subsequently narrowed the scope of the Statute. In 
2006, Esther Kiobel brought her case against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Trade 
and Transportation Company for aiding and abetting violations of the law of nations committed 
by the Nigerian government at the corporations’ behest. Ultimately, the Nigerian government’s 
desire to quell opposition to these companies’ extraction process resulted in the execution of her 
husband. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed Kiobel with a decision that centered on 
technical questions of jurisdiction. Through this approach, the Court obscured its own politics 
and distances itself from the unjust consequences of its decisions. This is not unique to the 
Kiobel case; rather it is a byproduct of the indeterminacy of the legal form. In this case, the 
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Kiobel decision has drastically altered the balance of power between corporations and peoples of 
the global South, removing one of the few forums for financial redress for violations of IHRL. 
Chapters III, IV, and V discuss the Court’s decision in Kiobel, its legal inconsistencies, and the 
politics of the judgment. Chapter III addresses the majority’s decision to raise the question of 
extraterritoriality sua sponte. line of argument. The Court originally heard argument regarding 
the Second Circuit Court’s decision, which addressed whether the ATS established jurisdiction 
for corporate defendants. However, the Court raised the question of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality sua sponte. This allowed the Court to sidestep the issue of corporate liability 
for tortuous breaches of the law of nations and focus on the defendants’ relationship to the U.S. 
Absent from their decision was an acknowledgement that it was six corporations involved in 
ATS litigation that first presented the Court with this line of argument. Chapter IV discusses the 
legal content of the doctrine of presumption against extraterritoriality and its applicability to 
ATS jurisprudence. The doctrine traditionally applied to legislation regulating actions committed 
abroad, while the ATS is strictly jurisdictional. To justify the presumption against 
extraterritoriality’s applicability to the ATS, the majority opinion employs a legally inconsistent 
analysis of the crime of piracy and dismisses previous courts’ handling of foreign policy 
considerations arising under the ATS. Chapter V focuses on the link between defendants and the 
U.S. required by the Court. The majority chose not to explain how their decision in Kiobel fit 
with prior cases involving extraterritorial violations of IHRL. Since the majority provided little 
insight as to what actions would meet “touch and concern with significant force” threshold to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, it is left to lower courts to interpret the 
threshold. By and large, the lower courts’ decisions have favored corporate defendants. As a 
result, plaintiffs and potential future plaintiffs have lost one of their few opportunities for getting 
compensation and corporate actors are emboldened by diminishing accountability for human 
rights violations. However, the majority’s inclusion of this “touch and concern with significant 
force” threshold leaves space for further interpretation, potentially allowing a future court to 
adopt a more pro-plaintiff approach. 
It has been left to courts to delineate the parameter of the ATS because text of the ATS is 
ambiguous and open-ended and little is known about the intent of its drafters. Cases under the 
ATS tend to have foreign policy implications because often both the plaintiff and the defendant 
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are aliens, and previous cases often addressed actions which occurred outside U.S. territory. 
There is also concern that the U.S. would overextend its jurisdiction and interfere in the internal 
affairs of other sovereigns. However, ATS litigation during the twenty-first century has focused 
on the actions of transnational corporations, and this litigation is one of the only avenues for 
victims of corporate human rights violations to seek compensation. I argue that this is a positive 
development for three reasons. First, it partially remedies the unenforceability of IHRL by 
awarding damages that corporations can afford to pay and yet are large enough to act as a 
deterrent. Plaintiffs have successfully won judgments or settled cases and received remedy. 
Corporations were concerned enough about the amounts levied to mount a concerned legal and 
political pushback against these types of cases, and were ultimately rewarded with success with 
the Kiobel decision. Second, it reorients the IHRL discourse and focuses also on the role of 
corporations rather than only governments in the global South. This partially acknowledges that 
the root causes of many IHRL violations, including violations of rights related to environmental 
integrity, are often in the interests of global capital as well as ruling elites in the global South and 
thus plaintiffs are unlikely to find redress in their countries of origin. Finally, it draws attention 
to the human rights abuses committed or encouraged by international corporations. Too often 
stories of human rights abuse victims are never heard, but ATS provides a public platform. In 
many cases, fear of the publicity associated with ATS trials pressured corporations to reach 
pretrial settlements and alter behavior. However, the Kiobel decision drastically narrowed the 
scope of the ATS.  
The Supreme Court now has an opportunity to rectify its failings in Kiobel. It recently concluded 
oral arguments in Jesner v. Arab Bank and is expected to finally decide whether corporate 
defendants are permitted under the ATS.330 Legal scholars heavily criticized the Court’s last two 
decisions on the ATS, Sosa and Kiobel, 331 for legal inconsistencies and for empowering 
corporations rather than the individuals they exploit. It is possible that the Court will pursue a 
different approach with regards to the ATS this time around, one which balances the need for 
limitations to ATS litigation with the need for corporate accountability for extraterritorial actions 
undertaken to maximize profit in violation of human rights. Such an approach, including an 
explicit acknowledgment of the political stakes, could cement the U.S. federal court system as an 
 
330 808 F. 3d. 114 (2d. Cir. 2014).  
331 Supra note 30 & Supra note 12. 
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avenue for redress and alter the balance of power in favor of plaintiffs. Alternatively, the Court 
may instead completely close the door on corporate liability under the ATS. This would further 
cement the interests of powerful transnational corporations at the expense of human rights. If the 
Court sides with the corporations without explicitly addressing the politics of that choice, its 
decision will likely contain the same legal inconsistencies as Kiobel. More importantly, it will 
produce the same devastating effect, further emboldening corporate actors to exploit people for 
profit.  
